Descarga la aplicación para disfrutar aún más
Vista previa del material en texto
1 Falabella in 2018: Challenges of a Latin American Giant* I. Introduction By the beginning of 2018, Falabella was the Latin American retailer with the largest market capitalization (more than USD 24 billion)1 and one of the regions’ main retailers in in terms of annual revenues (USD 15 billion) and EBITDA (USD 2 billion)2 – a summary of Falabella financials is shown in Exhibit 1. The company, headquartered in Santiago, Chile, had more than 110.000 employees and operated department stores, supermarkets, home-improvement, shopping malls and a credit business in 7 countries, including Brazil and Mexico. The recent announcement of the arrival of Amazon to Chile and the continuous growth in the penetration of Alibaba and other e-commerce vendors in Latin America posit significant challenges for Falabella’s senior executives, who are deciding how to adapt the company’s operations and allocate investments. While its main businesses remained to be driven by sales in physical stores, Falabella initiated a more aggressive expansion into e-commerce, whose sales explained almost 8% of total revenues in last quarter of 2017.3 Carlo Solari, chairman of Falabella’s board noted: “The emergence of new technologies such as e-commerce, widespread cell phone adoption, communications and logistics innovations, and big data processing, among others, have all changed the entire retail map. This has required companies to strongly innovate, react more promptly, and clearly stand out from the competition. We have had to reinvent our companies to serve our customers 24 hours a day through various channels, within an increasingly demanding environment”.4 Even though Falabella’s senior management team thought that there were still important growth opportunities in the brick and mortar business in many Latin American countries, including the recently opened operations in Brazil and Mexico, they knew the challenges posited by the e-commerce business model, where Falabella had the stated goal of becoming the largest on-online retailer of Latin America. The question about how to approach this dual retail world kept the minds of Falabella’s executives busy and made them wonder whether the historical strength of Falabella, fueled by horizontal, vertical and international expansion, would be still a source of value for the coming future, or whether they should focus their forces on the online business. II. Falabella’s business units and Internationalization Falabella was a Chilean-based corporation offering a wide range of products and services in five business divisions: department stores, home improvement, supermarkets, real estate and financial services. The integrated retail format sought to achieve synergies with regards to purchasing volumes and consumer information. All business segments * This case was written by Professor Jorge Tarzijan with the excellent collaboration of Renata Loew, solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. This case was developed from published sources. 2 operated in Latin American countries (see its current presence in Exhibit 2). Through time, Falabella has used different mechanisms to expand into different businesses and countries (see timeline in Exhibit 3). Department Stores Falabella was founded in 1889 when Salvatore Falabella, an Italian immigrant, opened the first large tailor shop in the north of Chile. In 1958, it evolved into a department store through the introduction of a wide array of home products. Fueled by organic growth and acquisitions, by January 2018, Falabella operated 111 department stores (730.000 square meters) in four countries with almost USD 4.5 billion in annual revenues.5 Falabella’s business strategy in department stores was characterized by offering a wide variety of products and by establishing strong relationships with its suppliers, both domestically and abroad. The company had also developed and introduced an increasing selection of its own brand name products. Although the department store business sought to consider local needs and consumer trends it generally maintained uniform store planning and general marketing and commercial policies standards. Though the company operated standalone stores and stores in third-party shopping centers, Falabella’s department stores sales were positively impacted as its shopping mall business expanded. The internationalization of the department store business of Falabella began in 1993, when the company opened a store in Argentina. Two years later, Falabella entered Peru by acquiring 70 percent of the local department store chain Saga. Next international expansion took place in 2006, in Colombia, where Falabella opened three stores within two years, whereas in 2008 it acquired Casa Estrella, a traditional Colombian department store chain, with 5 stores.6 Department stores’ growth has continued in all four countries, keeping consistent market leadership (see Chile department stores market shares in Exhibit 4). Shopping Malls In 1990 the company entered the shopping mall business with a 50 percent stake in the Mall Plaza group. It launched Mall Plaza Vespucio, the first of several shopping centers opened in Chile targeted mainly at middle-income consumers. At that time, there was only one mall in Chile, Parque Arauco, launched in 1982 by an independent mall developer.7 Since then, the shopping mall industry had been growing in Latin America. One of the main reasons behind this growth was consumers increasing preference to purchase different goods and services in the same place, so called “one stop shopping” (annual visits to Falabella’s shopping malls is presented in Exhibit 5). To be successful, shopping malls should have a good variety and mix of offerings and important anchor stores — mainly department stores, home improvements and, to a lesser extent, supermarkets. By the beginning of 2018, Falabella’s shopping malls had more than 3 million GLA.8 The business model of the shopping malls in Latin America developed differently from the US (United States of America), where most of them are isolated from the cities. 3 Home Improvement The entry of Falabella in the home improvement market was in 1998, when the company announced a joint venture with Home Depot, the largest home improvement chain in the United States, which was about to start its operations in Chile.9 Home Depot held a controlling interest in the partnership by owning two thirds of the shares. It brought to Chile the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) concept. DIY customers were generally people who repaired and renovated their own homes. However, the difference in the level of development of the DIY concept between the US and Chile was reflected in a lower level of consumer involvement in DIY activities and lower sales. Consumers gave more importance to the attractiveness of the store, service quality, assortment of merchandise and decoration products, rather than to DIY or low prices.10 Despite the opening of five stores, after three years of operations and with mounting financial losses, in December of 2001 Home Depot sold its shares to Falabella, which changed the name to Home Store. As Home Store, Falabella was able to quickly improve financial results. Despite Home Store’s success, in 2003 it had only a small share of the USD 4 billion-a-year home improvement market dominated by a competitor named Sodimac, with 51 stores in Chile and 6 in Colombia. Sodimac had introduced a new style of store, combining home products (like furniture and appliances), home improvement and construction goods.11 After extended negotiations, Falabella acquired Sodimac. Falabella increased its internationalization with the opening of its first stores in Peru in 2004 and in Argentina in 2008.12in 2014, it acquired its main Peruvian competitor13 and together they made up about 20% market share in a highly fragmented market. In 2013, Falabella acquired a home improvement chain named Dicico, with strong presence in the state of São Paulo, Brazil (56 stores)14. Carlo Solari, Falabella’s Chairman, explains that Falabella’s short-term focus in Brazil was on home improvement and mainly in the state of São Paulo, “which is already like entering a country” (see market sizes at Exhibit 6).15 The Home Improvement market in Brazil was very fragmented, with the top 5 players accounting for less than 10% of the market.16 In 2015, new Sodimac Homecenter stores were launched in São Paulo and Uruguay.17 Next expansion was in the home improvement market of Mexico. Valued at USD 30 billion annually, it is the second largest market in Latin America, after Brazil.18 In October 2017, Falabella announced a partnership with the second largest supermarket chain in Mexico, Organización Soriana (see Exhibit 7). It aimed to jointly develop home improvement and financial services in Mexico.19 The investment plan envisaged opening 20 Sodimac stores in Mexico within five years,20 many of them adjacent to Soriana’s supermarkets.21 Regarding Sodimac’s strategy in the home improvement market, Carlo Solari pointed that “We realized that the increase in per capita income in the Latin American region, which translates into higher spending by households, was not being well addressed because there were few competitors in the home improvement category. So, we took advantage of that opportunity and entered Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico. We are strengthening our 4 presence in "traditional" countries where we have opened stores, and we are betting heavily on home improvement in Brazil and Mexico” (see Falabella’s home improvement expansion in Exhibit 8).22 In May 2018, Falabella reported an agreement with the Swedish furniture and decoration giant IKEA, confirming its arrival in South America. The agreement included the opening of at least nine stores in the next nine years in Chile, Colombia and Peru, with their respective websites. The estimated total investment ascends to USD 600 million.23 The CEO of Ikea Group, Torbjörn Lööf, said, "we are very happy to bring Ikea to South America with Falabella given their experience and leadership in the region. Together we will work to make Ikea a brand that is dear and meaningful to people.”24 Supermarkets Falabella entered the supermarket business in 2002, when it launched a supermarket chain in Peru named Tottus. After opening several more stores in Peru, it entered the Chilean market by acquiring an 88% share of the San Francisco, a supermarket chain with 4% of market share. In 2005, Falabella opened the first Tottus in Chile and by 2009 unified all supermarkets under Totus brand and management.25 Despite customers’ average purchase per visit to a supermarket being lower than to a department or home improvement store, customers visit supermarkets more regularly. In May 2007, Falabella announced the intention to merge with D&S, the largest supermarket chain in Chile.26 At the end of 2006, the market share of D&S in the supermarket industry was 33.5% and the share of San Francisco/Tottus about 5%. Their closest competitor would be Cencosud, which had a 31.3% of market share. Though D&S’s main line of business was by far the supermarket industry, D&S also had a relatively important participation in the credit card industry and a stake in a shopping mall business. However, Chile’s antitrust commission blocked the merge. They stated, “Carrying out this merger would lead to enormous change in the structure of the market, creating an enterprise that would be the dominant player in integrated retailing as well as in practically all of its individual segments (department stores, home improvement, supermarkets, real estate and associated financial businesses)”. In 2009, Walmart purchased a majority stake of D&S and started operating 250 stores in Chile, holding a market share of more than 35% in 2016. 27 By the beginning of 2018, Falabella counted with 63 stores in Chile and 61 in Peru in 435.000 square meters (see its expansion in Exhibit 8). Regarding the strategy, Carlo Solari pointed, “In Chile, supermarkets penetration is quite high versus other countries. Today we are smaller than other competitors, so we have worked not to be the largest supermarket chain, but to contribute with the corporation and with something different to consumers. We are growing with a strong own brands strategy, a strong strategy to have differentiated products, to offer something different to consumers. In Peru, supermarkets penetration is so low that we have a fairly aggressive growth. We believe that we have the opportunity to be supermarket leaders in Peru and grow at much faster rates”.28 5 Financial Business From its beginnings, Falabella extended credit to its customers. In 1980, the company entered the credit business and became the first store to introduce its own credit card, CRM, which was suitable to make purchases only in Falabella stores. To start a relationship with a client without a financial history, Falabella offered clients a credit card with a “small” credit line, which was dynamically modified according to consumers’ behavior. As a result, Falabella acquired valuable information from its customers and increase its client base. In 2010, CMR Falabella established alliances with Visa and MasterCard, which allowed the credit card to be used in third party stores.29 Wherever a new Falabella business was opened (department store, home improvement, supermarket and others), CMR was introduced and offered to customers. As of 2017, percentage of sales with CRM card was relevant in all Falabella’s business units, representing in department stores more than 45% of sales (see percentages of sales with CMR card in Exhibit 9).30 CRM had been the largest credit card issuer in Chile31, with a strategy of offering a large set of products and maybe the best loyalty program in the country.32 Falabella’s expansion into new business sectors included the launching of Banco Falabella in 1998. Carlo Solari explained: “The financial area has always been very relevant within the group. We realized that to maintain a relationship with customers, we had to go from being a credit card company to being a bank for people (personal banking)”.33 Insurance services, travel agency and virtual mobile operator also integrated the financial services business unit of Falabella, which self-declared to focus on “combining the stability of a traditional financial business with the proximity to customers that characterizes a retail company”.34 In 2018, Falabella announced the full integration of its credit card business (CMR) with Banco Falabella. The corporate general manager of Fabella financiero, Juan Manuel Matheu, mentioned that “the integration points to give an additional boost to the growth of CMR and Banco Falabella, improving their future perspectives”.35 CRM expanded to Peru in 1998, and then to Colombia and Argentina in 2006. By the end of 2017, CRM active accounts were almost 5 million and Banco Flabella had 264 branches along Chile, Peru, Colombia and Argentina.36 In that same year, Falabella concluded purchasing 50% of the shares of the Mexican company, Soriban (Servicios Financieros Soriana S.A.P.I de C.V.) from Citi-Banamex, for approximately USD 35 million. Future expansion to Mexico projected 40 new CRM branches in one year, as well as an integrated offer of services and credit products within Soriana’s more than 800 stores.37 E-commerce In 1999, Falabella’s first e-commerce platform was launched for its departments stores in Chile, expanding to Argentina in 2005 and to Colombia in 2010. Later, in 2012, it updated its ecommerce platform and launched click & collect (purchaseonline and pick-up at the 6 store), as part of an omnichannel and digitalization strategy.38 Subsequently, in 2013, sales of Falabella Chile online channel grew 47%.39 In 2014, Falabella started rolling out ecommerce enabled tablets to its salespeople in stores, specifically for the departments of footwear, furniture and appliances. With these tablets, the salespeople were able to show and offer a wider range of products than what is physically available on the sales floor.40 Later, Falabella has made important investments to improve its mobile responsiveness, purchase journey41 and product assortment42.43 Sodimac and Tottus profited from Falabella’s department store online developments on slower steps and with variations. Sodimac’s e-commerce was launched on 2001 in Chile and started to expand to other countries in 2010. Click & collect was implemented in Chile in 2015, then in Colombia, Argentina and Peru.44 Totus Chile e-comerce was launched in 2010 and then expanded to Peru in 2014. Explaining the company’s view regarding e-commerce, Carlo Solari explained that “we are convinced of the online commerce opportunity, but not as a replacement of the brick- and-mortar business. We may have fewer stores than previously would have been expected without internet, but they are complemented and enhanced by internet.” He also argued that “nowadays, it is more efficient to sell many products and categories through the web than to do it through our stores. It means that we are going in the right direction, and we will not only be the leaders of traditional commerce, but also of e-commerce in the region.” To complement, he added “we are making much more relevant investments than we did in the past to be as flexible and scalable as possible. In 2017, for example, we are investing around USD 100 million in a new distribution center for Falabella Chile, which will be the most modern distribution center in South America.”45 The new distribution center was designed to handle the logistics of home delivery of e-commerce sales, as well as restocking stores on a per unit basis, by size and color in Chile, as part of a USD 1.2 billion investment plan on logistics and technology46 (see Falabella’s investment plans in Exhibit 10). The rapid penetration of high-speed internet has facilitated the growth of online commerce (see smartphone penetration in Exhibit 11). In the fourth quarter of 2017, Falabella’s online channels posted 37.1% growth in revenue when compared to the same period in the former year, reaching USD 769 million for the year. “If we exclude internet sales, department stores sales would have probably decreased”, mentioned a Morgan Stanley stock markets analyst.47 III. General Institutional Information Market maturity and size differs among the countries where Falabella operated. Chile and Mexico were the most mature ones, with densities like those of developed economies. “Consolidation and e-commerce are key retail themes in Mexico today”, states the consultancy company ATKearney (see market maturity stages in Exhibit 12).48 Chile had opened its economy to international trade and deregulated its markets. On January 1, 2004, Chile and the U.S. became free trade partners. It had also signed a free trade pact with the European Union in 2002 and with China (2005), As a result, exports 7 and imports had strongly increased. Other Latin American countries followed this path of openness to international trade, although with different velocities. The openness to international trade had been paired with a growing per-capita income. Carlo Solari pointed that “We have benefited from the growth of the middle classes that has occurred in the Latin American region, and as the countries continue to grow, this trend will continue”.49 Historically, bankarization in Latin America had been lower than in the US and many European countries. However, its levels had been steadily increasing in the last two decades, mainly because of the higher income levels, improving technology, better scoring systems and the growing interest of banks by market share. Alongside with the higher levels of bankarization, there was an increase in the total number of active credit cards issued by banks. In terms of e-commerce, by 2019, 151.1 million people in Latin America are expected to buy goods and services online, compared to USD 121.1 million in 2016.50 The Latin America e-commerce market is still small, in comparison with the Asia Pacific or North American regions. Retail e-commerce in Latin America are expected to grow from USD 57.02 billion in 2016 to USD 84.75 billion by 2019. Brazil is the leader with over USD 16.58 billion in e-commerce sales in 2016, followed by Mexico (USD 7.19 billion) and Argentina (USD 5.1 billion) sale revenues per year. The average number of annual online transactions per-capita in Latin America in 2016 was the lowest worldwide (9.2). Latin America is also part of the mobile shopping movement51 In March 2016, 27% of internet users in Latin America used their mobile device to acquire a product and the percentage of e-commerce sales to total retail sales in the whole Latin American Region was 1.9%. Exhibit 13 shows selected information of the retail e- commerce market in Latin America, Exhibit 14 and Exhibit 15 show Worldwide and US trends in e-commerce and Exhibit 16 shows e-commerce penetration for the most sold product categories. IV. Main Competitors Falabella faced competition domestically and internationally from large companies at the integrated retail level (i.e., retailers that managed a set of businesses) as well as from focused competitors within each of its business units and-commerce players. The largest competitor at the integrated level in South America is Cencosud (leadership, revenues and EBITDA are compared in Exhibit 17), whereas the main competitor at the focused business level in Chile and Mexico is Walmart. In e-commerce, the main competitors are Mercado Libre, Amazon and Alibaba. Cencosud is a Chilean-based retailer that in 2012 ended a period of major acquisitions that involved the spending of more than USD 2.2 billion and reached sales of over USD 19 billion.52 Only on that year Cencosud acquired a supermarket chain in Brazil, Carrefour operations in Colombia and opened the biggest shopping mall in Chile in the tallest building of Latin America,53 accomplishing significant operations in all the countries where it had presence - Chile, Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Colombia.54 In the credit card 8 business, Cencosud developed joint ventures with local banks in Chile (Scotiabank), Brazil (Bradesco) and in Colombia (Colpatria).55 Cencosud had most of its EBITDA concentrated on the supermarket sector (43%), followed by home improvement (23%), department stores (15%), financial services (12%) and real state (7%).56 Around 2012, Cencosud shares began to underperform the Chilean general index share price (IGPA), while Falabella significantly outperformed Cencosud and the IGPA (Exhibit 18). In 2016, Cencosud launched its omnichannel strategy and innovated on delivery possibilities. Costumers could buy online, by telephone or at store. Delivery could happen at the destination (with a 90 minutes option in 12 cities), by click and collect57 or at a specific parking lot outside the store, where costumers used an intercom to announce themselves and received their order priory purchased.58 The company stated: “Our businesses reflect the growing trend of using online platforms. The percentage of overall customers using our online services increases every year, as well as the percentage of online sales over total revenue”.59 Cencosud announced that in 2018 intends to launch its online marketplace60 and a dark store61 in 2019.62 In Peru, Falabella’s main competitor was Supermercados Peruanos, which held grocery store sector leadership with supermarkets, hypermarketsand discount stores. Other relevant competitors were Cencosud and Makro (a wholesaler chain). Department stores competitors in Peru included Ripley, Cencosud and Oeschle (Grupo Intercorp). In the home improvement sector, Cencosud and Falabella shared the leadership, followed by Promart (Grupo Intercorp).63 In Colombia, the most relevant competitors were Cencosud, Almacenes Éxito (which was a leading Colombian food retailer with presence also in Brazil and Argentina64, partly owned by the French retailer Casino) and Drogarias Olímpicas – a Colombian supermarket and drugstore retailer with wide geographical cover in the country and with presence in Central America65. Additionally, Koba Colombia SA’s discounter chain had attracted even traditional consumers of hypermarkets and supermarkets, opening more than 160 stores between the first quarter 2016 and the same period of 2017.66 In Argentina, the leading player in grocery retail was Carrefour (5% value share in 2016), which competes with Cencosud, Wal-Mart and Casino, among others.67 Retail was a highly fragmented channel in Argentina, featuring numerous independent players.68 In the Brazilian home improvement sector, the main competitors were Leroy Merlin and C&C,69 whereas the biggest retailers in the country were the supermarkets Carrefour and Pão de Açucar (owned by Casino) 70. Mexico had a fragmented competitive environment due to the relevance of traditional formats and small independent retailers across all channels. Wal-Mart de México led retailing in 2017, holding a strong position considering that its market share was more than twice as high as that of the second biggest player, FEMSA Comercio (which owned OXXO, the largest convenience store chain in Latin America).71 At the end of 2016, Wal- Mart de México launched a pilot test to boost internet sales through its retailing discounter store Bodega Aurrera. It targeted bottom to middle-income consumers that were often 9 unfamiliar with the process of buying online and lack a credit card to pay for online purchases.72 Another major retailer in Mexico was Puerto de Liverpool, which counted with three main integrated business: Retail Department Stores & Boutiques; Consumer Finance and Shopping Centers. With 131 stores in the country, it was the first retailer in Mexico to implement Omni-channel. More than 45% of the total commercial sales were through own credit cards.73 In 2016, its total revenues were approximately 5.4 billion USD. Home Depot México was the leader in the Mexican home and garden specialist market.74 Other important competitors were the US based SSLJ.com, Lowe's Companies, Bed Bath & Beyond and the décor superstore At Home Group.75 Online Competitors The emergence of new technologies such as e-commerce, communications, logistic innovations and big data processing, among others, changed the entire retail map.76 By 2017, the e-commerce industry had an estimated value of USD 432.4 billion, growing 13.4% per year between 2012 and 2017. The increased usage of mobile devices complemented the e-commerce trend, as retailers were increasingly tailoring their digital content for mobile viewers (see most popular e-commerce platforms in Latin Americain Exhibit 19). Mercado Libre With over 50.5 million unique visitors in 2016, Mercado Libre is the e-commerce platform with the largest number of visitors in Latin America. Mercado Libre is a C2C e-commerce platform similar to eBay.com, and it is present in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Portugal, Uruguay and Venezuela. Through its marketplace and related services, Mercado Libre provided buyers and sellers a robust ecommerce environment that fosters the development of a growing ecommerce community. One of its business with greater growing potential was an integrated online payments solution, Mercado Pago, which offered world-class payments solutions and is reshaping the financial industry in the region. With more than 10 million sellers and almost 34 million buyers, in 2017 the company’s revenue was USD 839 million from marketplace activities and USD 559 million non-marketplace. Launched in 1999, it was among the top- 10 online retail sites in the world and was one Latin America’s “unicorn” - companies with a valuation of over a billion dollars.77,78 Amazon With almost USD 178 billion revenues in 2017 (USD 54 billion outside North America)79, Amazon is the largest online retailer in the US, with 44% of the e-commerce sales and 4% of all retail in the country.80 Amazon focuses mainly on the retail, logistics, cloud computing, consumer technology, and media and entertainment industries. Its growth is powered by three programs: Marketplace (its third party seller business), Amazon Prime (subscription shipping plan) and Amazon Web Services (AWS, its cloud services business). Since Amazon went public in 1998, the message of its founder and Chief 10 Executive Officer Jeff Bezos has been to “build culture, take risk and focus on the long term”, with the stated objective of being the largest retailer worldwide81 In the third-party marketplace, Amazon offered services such as warehousing, shipping, customer service, payment processing and return services. Additionally, in 2015 Amazon launched Amazon Business, a marketplace tailored to business customers. Amazon charged third parties a percentage of the sale and additional fees for warehousing, shipment and logistics, originating in 2017 revenues of almost USD 32 billion, doubling 2015’s revenues (USD 16 billion).82 More than 2 million third parties sold through Amazon marketplace, accounting for more than 50% of the total items sold by the company83. According to some sources, Amazon’s profits margins on third-party sales were higher than on its own sales84. Amazon Prime offers quick unlimited delivery for members that pay an annual subscription fee. The program was launched in 2005, with a two-day delivery service for 1 million eligible products for an annual fee of USD 79, with a one-day delivery upgrade for USD 3.99. In 2016, it launched a monthly fee option. By the end of 2017, Prime members exceeded 100 million worldwide, and they acquire 5 billion items during the year85. Amazon Web Services (AWS), on the other hand, provides on-demand cloud computing platforms to individuals, companies and governments, on a paid subscription basis. In 2017, AWS comprised a variety of services including storage, computing, database, networking, application services, developer tools, Internet of things and analytics. Amazon had been building warehouses closer to major consumption centers to offer same day delivery in some product categories and two-day deliver in others. Amazon had been also investing heavily in fulfillment facilities in Europe, Asia and the Americas (including handling, warehousing, logistic and shipment).86 Recently, Amazon has been entering into the offline business with the opening of selected stores in the US. As a confirmation of its interest, in 2017 Amazon bought the organic supermarket chain WholeFoods (more than 450 brick-and-mortar stores) in a deal valued at USD 13.7 billion. In January 2017, Amazon arrived to Chile with Amazon Web Services (AWS), the business line that groups the computing and technology businesses of the firm. Amazon rented locations and hired executives to increase its presence in Chile and Latin America, announcing also the implementation of its service “Prime Now”87 and the analysis of further expansions into e-commerce in the Latin American region.88 Proof of the interest of Amazon in the region was the visit of AWS’s Vice President Teresa Carlson to the Chilean President Sebastian Piñera in May 2018 to express the company’s intention to increase its business activity in Chile.89 Alibaba Alibaba group was a Chinese multinational worldwide marketplace, internetand technology conglomerate founded in 1999, with no distribution or inventory holding90. It provided consumer to consumer (C2C), business to consumer (B2C) and business to business (B2B) sales services in web portals. It also offered electronic payment services, cloud computing services and search engines to shop. 11 Alibaba business had grown in Latin America, where it had operations in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and used a multi-language portal to reach clients from different countries91. Alibaba first experience in Latin America was its entry to Brazil in 2010 and since then has set up cross-border business-to-business and business-to- consumer e-commerce platforms that developed well in that country92. Jack Ma, founder and executive president of Alibaba, expressed his interests in further developing Alibaba’s businesses in Latin America93 Its Head of International Marketing and Business Development recognized that they had made a number of studies and work with extensive databases to identify the countries in which they wanted to be, and Chile was one of them, mainly because it had an stable political situation, good growth prospects and large internet penetrations.94 Aside from the company’s core business, Alibaba had been developing in China an alliance with the supermarket Auchan Retail S.A. and the wholesaler Ruentex, intended to bring online and offline shopping together in the food sector.95 Regarding competition from e-commerce vendors, Carlo Solari mentioned that: “The Internet lowers entry barriers and makes these great foreign actors compete through the Internet in Chile, Peru or Colombia. It is not a question about whether they will arrive, we are already competing with them. In this game, our competitors will be all the actors in the world”.96 V. Looking ahead The senior management team has to outline key priorities for the growth expectation of Falabella’s executives and investors. How to allocate future investments and how to approach growth were among the key priorities. Carlo Solari pointed that “In order to have the scale that allows us to make investments in technology, in logistics, to attract the best talent, to be able to buy from all parts of the world at the best price, we need to grow”97. For instance, an interesting debate was whether Falabella should prioritize its online business or the international expansion (as investment plans presented in Exhibit 10). In the online business, some executives wonder whether it will be a good idea to explore an alliance with companies such as Amazon and Alibaba and/or whether Falabella should invest heavily in the marketplace business. A follow-up question is whether Falabella should allow its existing suppliers to sell in the marketplace or whether it should focus on the suppliers not currently sourcing Falabella. Another discussion was about whether the company should reinforce its international brick and mortar expansion or freeze it. In the case of continuing expansion, should the company acquire “big” players, grow organically, acquire “small” players (like Dicico in Brazil) or enter into partnerships with local players (such as with Soriana in Mexico)? After all these relevant questions, the most intriguing one in the agenda was still: How should the company take advantage of its strengths to compete in this dual retail world? 12 Exhibit 1 - Falabella’s Financials (in millions USD) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Income Statement Sales/Revenue 12,720 12,480 11,819 12,847 14,608 Gross Income 4,376 4,512 4,119 4,275 4,920 Gross Margin 34% 36% 35% 33% 34% EBITDA 1,720 1,674 1,568 1,720 1,975 EBITDA Margin 14% 13% 13% 13% 14% Net Income 846 766 732 910 829 Net Margin 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% Balance Sheet Current assets 9,662 9,075 8,766 9,718 10,770 Non-current assets 9,201 9,624 8,986 11,082 12,606 Total assets 18,862 18,699 17,752 20,800 23,376 Current Liabilities 3,804 3,738 3,457 4,450 4,746 Non-current liabilities 9,050 9,283 9,046 10,106 11,474 Total liabilities 12,854 13,021 12,503 14,556 16,220 Stockholders' equity 6,008 5,678 5,250 6,244 7,156 Total liabilities and stockholders' equity 18,862 18,699 17,752 20,800 23,376 Total Liabilities / Total Assets 61% 64% 65% 64% 63% Current Ratio 2.41 2.33 2.43 2.10 2.20 Quick Ratio 1.97 1.89 1.97 1.71 1.79 Note: Fiscal year January-December. USD conversion according to Falabella's annual reports (as of 31 December). Source: “SACI Falabella”, Morningstar, avaible at: http://financials.morningstar.com/income- statement/is.html?t=FALABELLA®ion=chl , accessed June, 2018. 13 Exhibit 2 - Falabella’s Presence in 2017 Country Department Stores Home Improvement Supermarkets Financial Services Real State Total USD 4 billion revenues USD 5,8 billion revenues USD 2,2 billion revenues USD 7,0 billion loan book 2,1 million m2 of GLA 4.4 million active CRM cards 41 shopping/ power center Chile 45 stores 87 stores 63 stores 2,383,000 active 318,000 m2 730,000 m2 210,000 m2 CRM cards Peru 29 stores 56 stores 61 stores 966,000 active 177,000 m2 372,000 m2 225,000 m2 CRM cards Colombia 26 stores 38 stores 1,040,000 active 175,000 m2 367,000 m2 CRM cards Argentina 11 stores 8 stores 300,000 active 58,000 m2 86,000 m2 CRM cards Brazil 56 stores 158,000 m2 Uruguay 3 stores 25,000 m2 Mexico Coming soon Falabella- Soriana credit card recently lanched Notes: Does not include an 982,000 m2 of additional GLA in free standing stores in the region also owned by S.A.C.I. Falabella. Revenues as of September 2017 LTM. Number of stores and sales area as of September 2017. Number of CMR accounts with balance. FX rate as of October 2rd 2017 (637,93 CLP/USD ). Home Improvement includes Sodimac Colombia, which the company does not consolidate. Does not include Uruguay revenue, which the company does consolidate. Source: S.A.C.I. Falabella January 2018 Corporate Presentation. 14 Exhibit 3a - Falabella’s Business Units Timeline per Country Chile Year Growth Department Store Home Improvement Supermarket Real State Financial 1889 Organic First Falabella shop 1980 Organic CMR launch (credit card) 1990 Organic Mall Plaza inauguration 1997 Alliance Home Depot joint venture (30%) 1998 Organic Banco Falabella launch 2001 M&A Home Depot acquisition (100%) 2003 M&A Sodimac acquisition (100%) 2004 M&A San Francisco acquisition (88%) 2005 Organic Tottus launch Source: Falabella’s Annual Reports. 15 Exhibit 3b - Falabella’s Business Units Timeline per Country Argentina Year Growth Department Store Home Improvement Supermarket Real State Financial 1993 Organic Falabella launch 2006 Organic CRM launch 2008 Organic Sodimac Homecenter launch Colombia Year Growth Department Store Home Improvement Supermarket Real State Financial 1993 Organic Falabella launch 1994 Organic Sodimac launch* 2006 Organic CRM launch 2012 First mall inauguration 2013 M&A Casa Estrella acquisition (100%) * In 2003, Falabella bought Sodimac and continued its operation in Colombia. Source: Falabella’s Annual Reports. 16 Exhibit 3c - Falabella’s Business Units Timeline per Country Peru Year Growth Department Store Home Improvement Supermarket Real State Financial 1995 M&A Saga acquisition (98%) 1998 Organic CMR launch 2002 Organic Tottus first stores launch 2004 Organic Sodimac launch 2007 Organic Mallplaza first internacionalization 2014 M&A Maestro acquisition (100%) Organic Hiperbodega Precio Uno launch Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico Year Country Growth Home ImprovementFinancial 2013 Brazil M&A Dicico acquisition (60%) 2015 Brazil Organic Sodimac Homecenter Launch 2015 Uruguay Organic Sodimac Homecenter Launch 2016 Mexico Alliance Joint Venture with Soriana Joint Venture with Soriana Source: Falabella’s Annual Reports 17 Exhibit 4 - Department Stores Market Share in Chile Per year, in percental points Competitors 2014 2015 2016 12MM Jun17 Falabella 34 34 35 35 Paris (Cencosud) 25 25 25 25 Ripley 20 19 18 18 Abcdin 8 9 9 9 La Polar (Cencosud) 9 8 8 7 Hites 5 5 5 5 Total 100 100 100 100 Source: Ricardo Bennet, “Department Stores”, Censcosud Day 2017 presentation, website: http://s2.q4cdn.com/740885614/files/doc_presentations/2017/10/Cencosud-Day-TxD-(DS)-ENG.pdf, accessed April, 2018. 18 Exhibit 5 - Annual Visits to Falabella’s Shopping Malls (in millions) Source: Falabella’s Annual Reports (per respective year) 70 75 91 106 114 128 147 164 185 199 206 246 266 280 385 387 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 19 Exhibit 6 - Market Sizes Selected Latin American Countries Countries Population (mm) GDP (USD bn) GDP per capta (USD 000's) Argentina 44 545 12,453 Brazil 208 1,796 8,647 Chile 18 247 13,800 Colombia 49 282 5,800 Mexico 127 1,047 8,211 Peru 32 192 6,044 Uruguay 3 52 15,417 Latin America & Caribbean 638 5,320 8,341 Source: World Bank Data 2016 Brazil Region / Satte Population (MM) GDP (USD bn) GDP per capta (USD 000's) North Region 18 97 5,430 Northeast Region 57 257 4,495 Southeast Region* 87 981 11,294 Minas Gerais State 21 157 7,458 Espírito Santo State 4 36 9,119 Rio de Janeiro State 17 199 11,966 São Paulo State 45 588 13,093 South Region 30 305 10,320 Central-West Region 16 176 11,119 Total 205 1,817 8,558 * Minas Gerais, Espírito Santos, Rios de Janeiro and São Paulo states compound the Brazilian Southeast Region Source: Wikipidia data for 2014 20 Exhibit 7 – Organización Soriana In 2017, Organización Soriana revenues were USD 8.4 billion. Soriana was Mexico's second-largest retailer based on sales (behind Wal-Mart Mexico). It had 824 stores, which comprised 270 hypermarkets (huge stores that sell both food and general merchandise), 129 supermarkets, 142 grocery stores, 103 mini-marts, 34 membership clubs (Sam’s Club competitor) and 76 other formats stores along more than 160 Mexican cities. It also operated about 14 distribution centers. Sources: D&B Hoovers, website: http://www.hoovers.com/company-information/cs/revenue- financial.organizaci%C3%B3n_soriana_sab_de_cv.0b105a879a6746d5.html, accessed April, 2018. “Falabella firma acuerdo con Soriana y finalmente ingresa al mercado Mexicano”, https://www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/actualidad/falabella-firma-acuerdo-con-soriana-y-finalmente-ingresa- al-mercado/2016-04-15/160654.html, accessed April, 2018. Soriana reports fourth quarter and full year 2017 financial results, http://recursos.soriana.com/recursos/resources/infoFin/2017/Eng- 2018_02_23_Press_Release_4QFY2017.pdf , accessed April, 2018. 21 Exhibit 8 - Falabella’s Stores Expansion 2008-2017 Number of Stores per Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017 Department Store 73 68 75 75 82 89 99 109 111 Argentina 9 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 Chile 40 35 36 36 38 40 45 44 45 Colombia 9 9 11 11 14 15 18 25 26 Peru 15 14 17 17 19 23 25 29 29 Home Improvement 100 101 109 116 134 201 240 246 248 Argentina 4 4 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 56 58 56 56 Chile 66 65 67 70 80 82 84 85 87 Colombia 17 19 20 23 29 32 34 38 38 Peru 13 13 16 17 18 24 56 56 56 Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Supermarket 40 43 55 64 76 88 101 121 124 Chile 23 26 31 37 43 48 52 61 63 Peru 17 17 24 27 33 40 49 60 61 Grand Total 213 212 239 255 292 378 440 476 483 Source: Falabella’s Annual Reports. 22 Exhibit 9 - Percentage of Sales with CMR Card Business Units 2017 Chile – Falabella 46.10% Chile – Sodimac 27.60% Chile – Tottus 20.10% Peru - Saga, Sodimac & Tottus 37.60% Colombia - Falabella & Sodimac 23.10% Argentina - Falabella & Sodimac 25.30% Percentage of Sales with CMR Card: The amount of sales revenue, as a percentage of total sales for that retail format, that corresponds to transactions made with a CMR credit card. As of 2Q16, the calculation “Percentage of Sales with CMR card” only takes into account the portion of the transaction that the client paid using the CMR card (on occasion, a client will use more than one method of payment in a transaction). In prior reports, the entire amount of the transaction was considered in this calculation. Source: S.A.C.I. Falabella EARNINGS REPORT 4rd Quarter 2017 23 Exhibit 10 – Falabella’s Investment plan 2018-2021: USD 3.9 billions * 108 stores; 8 shopping centers. Source: Falabella Investor Relations, website: https://www.falabella.com/static/staticContent/content/minisitios/Inversionistas/images/contenidoDescarga ble/otrasComunicaciones/2018/180107_Plandeinversiones2018-2021ENG.pdf, accessed April, 2018. 984 996 975 989 960 970 980 990 1000 2018 2019 2020 2021 Per Year, in million USD Remodeling and expansion of existing stores & shopping centers 31% IT, logistics & others 32% New stores and shopping centers 37% Per Investment Priority 24 Exhibit 11 - Smartphone Penetration (2017) Countries Penetration Smartphone users (000') Argentina 48% 21,329 Brazil 38% 79,578 Chile 56% 10,254 Colombia 35% 17,361 Mexico 41% 52,993 Peru 36% 11,585 United States 69% 226,289 These numbers are based on a model which takes into account a country’s economic progression, demography, online population, and inequality. Source: “Top 50 Countries by Smartphone Users and Penetration”, Newzoo, 2017, website: https://newzoo.com/insights/rankings/top-50-countries-by-smartphone-penetration-and-users/. Accesed, June, 2018. 25 Exhibit 12 - Retail Latin American Markets Maturity Stages Opening Peaking Maturing Declining Retail Markets Chile (1998) Peru (2002) Mexico (2003) Brazil (2006) Brazil (2013) Peru (2015) Mexico (2009) Mexico (2016) Chile (2016) Definition The middle class is growing, consumers are willing to explore organized formats, and government is relaxing restrictions. Consumers seek organized formats and exposure to global brands, retail shopping districts are being developed, and real state is affordable and available. Consumers spending has expanded, desirable real state is more difficult to secure, and local competition has become more sophisticated. Consumers are accustomed to modern retail, discretionary spending is high, competition for local and foreign retailers is fierce, and real state is expansive and not readily available. Typical Model Entry Minority investment in local retailer. Organic, such as trough direcly operated stores. Typically organic, but focus on tier 2 and 3 cities. Acquisitions. Source: The 2017 Global Retail Development Index, Accenture, July 2017 26 Exhibit 13 - Retail E-Commerce in Latin America Includes products or services ordered using the internet via any device, regardless of the method of payment or fulfillment; excludes travel and event tickets. * Forecasted numbers. ** As of 1st quarter 2016. Source: “E-commerce in Latin America - Statistics & Facts”, Statista, 2016, website: https://www.statista.com/topics/2443/us-ecommerce/. Accesed, June, 2018. 33,25 40,98 49,83 59,81 68,94 79,74 0 20 40 60 80 2014 2015 2016* 2017* 2018* 2019* Sales (in billion USD) 103,9 115,8 126,8 137,1 147,2 155,5 0 50 100 150 2014 2015 2016* 2017* 2018* 2019* Number of Digital Buyers (in millions) 33,6% 33,8% 33,5%31,5% 22,0% 33,9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Mexico Colombia Chile Peru Argentina Total Mobile Buyer Penetration** 27 Exhibit 14 – Worldwide Retail E-Commerce Trends * Forecasted numbers. ** Top 3 online stores revenues amounted to almost 100 billion USD in 2017. Source: “B2C E-Commerce”, Statista, 2018, website: https://www.statista.com/topics/2443/us- ecommerce/. Accessed, June 4, 2018. 1.336 1.548 1.845 2.304 2.842 3.453 4.135 4.878 -1.000 1.000 3.000 5.000 2014 2015 2016 2017** 2018* 2019* 2020* 2021* Sales (in billion USD) 7,4% 8,6% 10,2% 11,9% 13,7% 15,5% 17,5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 2015 2016 2017 2018* 2019* 2020* 2021* Share of Total Global Retail 28 Exhibit 15 - US Retail E-Commerce Trends * Forecasted numbers. ** Forecasted number. Apparel and accessories retail is projected to generate over 121 billion USD in revenues by 2021. *** All data refers to the 4th quarter of respective year. Source: “E-commerce in the United States - Statistics & Facts”, Statista, 2018, website: https://www.statista.com/topics/2443/us-ecommerce/. Accesed, June, 2018. 360.327 409.208 461.582 513.522 561.549 603.389 638.051 0 250.000 500.000 750.000 2016 2017 2018* 2019* 2020* 2021** 2022* Sales (in billion USD) 4,6% 5,1% 5,5% 6,1% 6,6% 7,5% 8,2% 9,1% 0% 5% 10% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 E-Commerce Share of Total Retail Sales*** 3,6% 9,0% 11,3% 11,2% 13,0% 16,9% 21,0% 24,0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mobile-Commerce Share of Total E-Commerce Spending*** 29 Exhibit 16 – E-Commerce Penetration for the Most Sold Product Categories * Data released by the U.S. Census Bureau. ** E-Commerce Volume not Available. Source: CBRE. https://www.cbre.us/research-and-reports/E-Commerce-by-Retail-Category-Finally- Revealed-by-US-Census-Bureau. Accesed, May, 2018. 24,2 22,5 1,0 0,5 20,0% 9,5% 3,3% 0,1% 0,0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Electronics & Appliances Cathegory** Clothing & Acessories Cathegory General Merchandise (department store inclusive) Food & Beaverage stores (supermarket inclusive) Motor vehicle & Parts Dealers E-Commerce Penetration* E-Commerce Volume (billion USD) E-Commerce Share 30 Exhibit 17 – Falabella and Cencosud: Market Leadership, Revenues and EBITDA Falabella Chile Peru Colombia Argentina Brazil Uruguay Mexico* EBITDA (100%) Department Stores #1 #1 #1 #1 17% Home Improvement #1 #1 #1 #2 #4 X X 18% Supermarkets #4 #3 4% Financial Services #1 #1 #5 X X 28% Real Estate (Malls) #1 #2 X 33% Revenues (100%) 62% 24% 6% 6% 2% EBITDA (100%) 74% 20% 4% 3% Cencosud Chile Peru Colombia Argentina Brazil EBITDA (100%) Department Stores #2 #4 15% Home Improvement #2 #2 #1 23% Supermarkets #2 #2 #3 #2 #4 43% Financial Services 12% Real Estate (Malls) #2 #1 7% Revenues (100%) 42% 9% 8% 25% 15% EBITDA (100%) 61% 11% 4% 24% 0% Legend: X - presence without leadership informed *When writing this case study, Falabella-Soriana had recently launched its credit card and Sodimac in Mexico would be launched soon. Sources: Respective Companies 2017 Earning Reports. 31 Exhibit 18 - Falabella and Cencosud Market Value Evolution Falabella first went public in 1196 and market value was USD 1.6 billion. In April 2018, market value was USD 14.17 trillion. Source: computations from Bloomberg.com data. 32 Exhibit 19 - Most Popular Platforms used by Sampled Latin American Companies Source: IDB survey of Connectamericas.com companies, website: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/8166/Accelerating-Digital-Trade-in-Latin-America- and-the-Caribbean.PDF?sequence=1, accessed April, 2018. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Upwork, Workana and/ou Freelancer eBay Facebook OLX Amazon Alibaba Own online store Mercado Libre 33 Endnotes 34 1 “The world’s biggest public companies”. 2017 Rankings. Forbes. www.Forbes.com/global2000/. 2 S.A.C.I. Falabella. Fourth quarter earnings report. 3 S.A.C.I. Falabella Earnings Report 4th Quarter 2017 4 Carlo Solari, Chairman of the board. Falabella. 2016 Annual report. 5 S.A.C.I. Falabella Corporate Presentation. January 2018. 6 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2008 Annual Report, p. 9. 7 On Parque Arauco website: http://www.parauco.com/historia/, accessed February 2018. 8 GLA stands for Gross Lettable Area. It is the total floor area designed for tenant occupancy. 9 Sodimac 2016 Annual Report. 10 For more informational about this case, see Constanza C Bianchi & Stephen J Arnold (2007) An Institutional Perspective on Retail Internationalization Success: Home Depot in Chile, The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 14:2, 149-169. 11 Sodimac 2016 Annual Report. 12 Sodimac 2014 Annual Report, p. 16. 13 Named Maestro. 14 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2013 Annual Report. 15 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 16 “Acquisition of 50,1% of Dicico”, S.A.C.I. Falabella Corporate Presentation, May, 2013. 17 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report. 18 “Chilean big-box stores coming next year”, Mexico News Daily, April 20, 2016, website: https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/chilean-big-box-stores-coming-next-year/ , accessed February, 2018. 19 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2017 Financial Statement. 20 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report. 21 “Chilean big-box stores coming next year”, Mexico News Daily, April 20, 2016, website: https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/chilean-big-box-stores-coming-next-year/ , accessed February, 2018. 22 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 23 http://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2018/05/17/906572/Falabella-firma-acuerdo-con-gigante-de-la- decoracion-Ikea-para-abrir-tiendas-en-Chile.html. Accessed, May 30th, 2018. 24 Source: Emol.com - http://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2018/05/17/906572/Falabella-firma- acuerdo-con-gigante-de-la-decoracion-Ikea-para-adri- stores-in-Chile.html. Accessed, May, 30th. 2018. 25 Company Overview of Tottus S.A., Bloomberg, website: https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=47639256 , accessed February, 2018. 26 “Chile retailers Falabella, D&S agree to merger”, Reuters, May 17, 2007, website: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1742360020070517, accessed February, 2018. 27 On America Retail website: http://www.america-retail.com/chile/chile-grandes-cadenas-de- supermercados-concentraron-el-75-de-las-compras-en-2016/, accessed February, 2018. 28 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 29 Falabella Annual Report. 2014. 30 S.A.C.I. Falabella 3rd Quarter 2017 EARNINGS REPORT . 31 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report . 32 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 33 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 34 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report. 35 Diario Financiero. https://www.df.cl/noticias/mercados/mercados-en-accion/falabella-integra-cmr-al- banco-y-se-esperan-sinergias-por-hasta-us-20/2018-05-31/201618.html. Accessed June 7, 2018. 36 S.A.C.I. Falabella January 2018 Corporate Presentation. 37 Soriana 2016 Annual Report, website: http://recursos.soriana.com/recursos/resources/infoFin/2016/2017_07_17_ReporteAnual_2016.pdf, accessed February, 2018. 35 38 S.A.C.I. Falaella 2012 Annual Report. 39 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2013 Annual Report. 40 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2014 Annual Report. 41 It redesigned online check-out process, which resulted in 40% fewer steps and fields to complete. 42 For example, the sports and perfume categories doubled the number of products offered online that year. 43 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report, p. 42. 44 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2015 Annual Report. 45 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 46 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report, p. 44. 47 “La Crisis de Crescimiento de Falabella”, El Mercurio, February 28, 2018, website: http://www.elmercurio.com/Inversiones/Noticias/Acciones/2018/02/28/El-mercado-quiere-mas-de- Falabella.aspx, accessed March, 2018. 48 “The 2016 Global Retail Development Index. Global Retail Expansion at Crossroads”, ATKearney, 2016, p. 6. 49 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 50 “E-commerce in Latin America - Statistics & Facts”, Statista, 2016. Available at: https://www.statista.com/topics/2453/e-commerce-in-latin-america/, accessed June, 2018. 51 “E-commerce in Latin America - Statistics & Facts”, Statista, 2016. Available at:https://www.statista.com/topics/2453/e-commerce-in-latin-america/, accessed June, 2018. 52 Cencosud - Our History, website http://investors.cencosud.com/English/investor-overview/about-us/our- history/default.aspx, accessed March, 2018. 53 Cencosud 2012 Annual Report. 54 Only where it has stores in the country: Northeast region, Minas Gerais and Río de Janeiro states. 55 Cencosud 3Q17 Corporate Presentation. 56 Cencosud 4Q17 Corporate Presentation. 57 Pick up at a special counter inside the store. 58 “Supermarkets in Chile - Cencosud Day presentation 2017”, website: http://s2.q4cdn.com/740885614/files/doc_presentations/2017/10/Cencosud-Day-2017-SM-Chile-ENG.pdf, accessed March 2018. 59 Cencosud 2016 Annual Report, p. 25. 60 E-commerce site where product or service information is provided by multiple third parties, whereas transactions are processed by the marketplace operator. 61 A dark store is generally a large warehouse that can either be used to facilitate a "click-and-collect" service, where a customer collects an item they have ordered online, or as an order fulfilment platform for online sales. 62 “Argentina Supermarket”, Cencosud Day 2017 presentation, website: http://s2.q4cdn.com/740885614/files/doc_presentations/2017/10/Cencosud-Day-SM-ARG-ENG.pdf, p.26. 63 “Análisis del Sector Retail: Supermercados, tuendas por departamento y Mejoramento de Hogar”, Equilibrium Clasificadora de Riesgos, July, 2015, website: http://www.equilibrium.com.pe/sectorialretailmar15.pdf, accessed April, 2018. 64 Almacenes Éxito Integrated Report 2016, https://www.grupoexito.com.co/images/shareholders-and- investors/documents/2017/mayo/Management_Report_Grupo_xito_2016.pdf, accessed April, 2018. 65 Olimpica website: http://www.olimpica.com/nuestras-tiendas/, accessed April, 2018. 66 http://www.euromonitor.com/grocery-retailers-in-colombia/report, accessed April, 2018. 67 “Grocery Retailers in Argentina”, December, 2016, website: http://www.euromonitor.com/grocery- retailers-in-argentina/report, accessed April, 2018. 68 “Home and Garden Specialist Retailers in Argentina: , Euromonitor, website: http://www.euromonitor.com/home-and-garden-specialist-retailers-in-argentina/report, accessed April, 2018. 69 “Análise Setorial Materiais de Construção”, GVcev – Centro de Excelência em Varejo da FGV-EAESP, 2012, website: https://cev.fgv.br/sites/cev.fgv.br/files/Material%20de%20Construcao.pdf, accessed April, 2018. 36 70 “As 22 maiores varejistas do Brasil: Pão de Açúcar perde 1° lugar”, Exame, August 14, 2017, website: https://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/as-22-maiores-varejistas-do-brasil-pao-de-acucar-perde-1-lugar/, accessed April, 2018. 71 Retailing in Mexico, Euromonitor, January 2018, website: http://www.euromonitor.com/retailing-in- mexico/report, accessed April, 2018. 72 “Internet Retailing in Mexico”, Euromonitor, January 2018, website: http://www.euromonitor.com/internet-retailing-in-mexico/report, accessed April, 2018. 73 Liverpool Third Quarter 2017 Results Corporate Presentation, website: https://www.elpuertodeliverpool.mx/docs/presentaciones/Presentacion-Inversionistas-ENE-2018.pdf , accessed April, 2018. 74 “Home and Garden Specialist Retailers in Mexico”, Euromonitor, January 2018, website: http://www.euromonitor.com/home-and-garden-specialist-retailers-in-mexico/report, accessed April, 2018. 75 “Developments in the Home Improvement Sector”, FinancialBuzz.com, February 5, 2018, website: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/developments-in-the-home-improvement-sector- 672757203.html, accessed April, 2018. 76 S.A.C.I. Falabella 2016 Annual Report, p. 6. 77 Mercado Libre 2017 Form 10-K, page 45, website: http://investor.mercadolibre.com/static- files/3837b94c-3ea4-408d-914b-e5bf81a8f592, accessed April, 2018. 78 “Accelerating Digital Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Inter-American Development Bank, March 2017, page 29, website: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/8166/Accelerating- Digital-Trade-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean.PDF?sequence=1, accessed April, 2018. 79 Amazon 2017 Form 10-K, page 70. 80 Amazon.com. Case Flash Forward. HBS, Case number 8694. 81 Tim Mullaney. “5 key business lessons from Amazon’s Jeff Bezos.” CNBC.com January 12, 2017. In “Amazon.com: Evolving into Offline Retail”. Won-Yong Oh. Ivey Publishing. Case W18088. 82 Amazon 2017 10K Report, page 69. 83 Amazon.com. Amazon annual report. Seattle: Amazon.com 2016. 84 “Amazon’s third party merchants are a growing piece of the sales pie”. Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2015. 85 Amazon.com, 2017 Annual Report. 86 Relentless.com. The Economist, June 21, 2014. 87 Prime Now is rapid-delivery option for subscribers to Amazon's Prime service. Prime membership offers free shipping, streaming video and music, and other benefits. 88 “¿Cómo se preparan Falabella, Cencosud y Ripley ante posible llegada de Amazon a Chile?”, Perú Retail, 5 July, 2017. 89 https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2018/05/23/technology/23reuters-chile-amazon-com.html. Accessed, May 30th, 2018. 90 Wells, John; Daskin, Galen; Ellsworth, Gabriel, “Amazon.com, 2016”, Harvard Business School, case study, p. 1. 91 Jimmy Tobyne. Strategic partnerships and Business development for the Americas, Connect America. 92 Ge, Yang. “Quick Take: Alibaba Eyes More Latin American Markets After Brazil”, Caxin, April 27, 2017, website: https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-04-27/101083978.html, accessed April, 2018. 93 El Norte Negocios. https://www.elnorte.com. 94 Emol.com, website: http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2015/05/29/719215/como-alibaba-se- gano-la-confianza-de-los-consumidores-latinoamericanos.html, 95 “Alibaba invierte 2.900 millones en cadena supermercados China”, EFE Empresas, November 21, 2018. 96 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017. 97 Patricio Poblete, “Carlo Solari: “Ya escogimos los países donde vamos a invertir en el corto plazo, y lo que vamos a hacer es profundizar y expandir”, Pulso, November 28, 2017.
Compartir