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CURSOS DE LA MAESTRIA EN ECONOMÍA 
VÁLIDOS COMO CURSOS ELECTIVOS DEL DEPARTAMENTO ACADÉMICOS DE ECONOMÍA 
PARA LOS ALUMNOS DEL PREGRADO 
 
Curso Requisitos Plan 2008 Plan 2010 Profesor Creditos Horario Fechas 
Tópicos 
Microeconómicos del 
Desarrollo 
Microeconomía II 
Concentración en 
Políticas Públicas 
Área de Política Social, 
Desarrollo Humano y 
Sociedad Civil 
Fernando 
Aragon 
2 Lu-Mi-Vi 7am-10am Del 25 de abril al 13 de Mayo 
Introducción a la 
Economía Experimental 
Econometría I 
Electivo otros del 
Departamento 
Académico de 
Economía 
Electivo Otros del 
Departamento 
Académico de 
Economía 
Francisco 
Galarza 
2 Ma-Ju 7am-10am Del 25 de abril al 27 de Mayo 
Macroeconomía con 
Fricciones 
Macroeconomía III 
Concentración en 
Macroeconomía y 
Economía 
Internacional 
Área de 
Macroeconomía y 
Política Económica 
Miguel Macera 2 Lu-Mi-Ju 7am-10am Del 30 de Mayo al 17 de junio 
Métodos de Predicción y 
Evaluación de 
Pronósticos 
Econometría II 
Electivo Otros del 
Departamento 
Académico de 
Economía 
Electivo Otros del 
Departamento 
Académico de 
Economía 
Roberto 
Duncan 
2 
Lu-Ma-Mi-Vi Sa 
7am-10am 
Del 20 de Junio al 2 de julio 
Economía Financiera 
Avanzada 
Teoría del Portafolio 
Concentración en 
Economía y Finanzas 
Área de Gestión 
Empresarial y 
Responsabilidad Social 
José Fajardo 2 Lu-Mi-Ju 7am-10am Del 4 de Julio al 22 de julio 
Economía de la 
Regulación 
Microeconomía II 
Concentración en 
Políticas Públicas 
Área de la Regulación Martin Rossi 2 Lu-Mi-Ju 7am-10am Del 1 de Agosto al 19 de Agosto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SÍLABO 
Curso: 
Economía de la 
Regulación 
Maestría en 
Economía 
 
Profesor: 
Martín Antonio Rossi 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Programa y Bibliografía 
 
1- Introducción a la economía de la regulación 
 
Monopolio natural. Empresa multiproductoras. Tarifas lineales y no lineales. Precios de 
Ramsey. Discriminación de precios. 
Bibliografía 
� Berg, S., and J. Tschirhart. Natural Monopoly Regulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. Capítulos 1, 2 y 3. 
� Berg, S., and J. Tschirhart. Natural Monopoly Regulation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. Capítulo 4. 
 
2- Tipos de regulación 
 
Regulación por costo de servicio y por precios máximos. Determinación del factor X en 
la fórmula de RPI-X. 
Bibliografía 
� Bernstein, J. and D. Sappington. “Setting the X factor in price cap regulation 
plans”. NBER Working Paper No.6622, 1998. 
 
3- Regulación óptima en presencia de asimetría de información 
 
El mecanismo de Vogelsang y Finsinger. Mecanismos de subsidio del excedente. 
Regulación en presencia de selección adversa. Regulación en presencia de moral 
hazard. 
Bibliografía 
� Armstrong, M. and D. Sappington (2003). “Recent Developments in the 
Theory of Regulation.” Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
� Train, K. Optimal Regulation. The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly. The 
MIT Press, 1991. Capítulos 5 y 6. 
 
4- Regulación óptima en presencia de múltiples firmas 
Yardstick competition. Práctica del benchmarking. 
Bibliografía 
� Shleifer, A. “A Theory of Yardstick Competition.” Rand Journal of Economics, 
1985, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 319-327. 
� Armstrong, M. and D. Sappington (2003). “Recent Developments in the 
Theory of Regulation.” Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SÍLABO 
Curso: 
Economía 
Financiera 
Avanzada 
Maestría en 
Economía 
 
Profesor: 
José Fajardo 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Objetivos del curso 
 
En este curso presentaremos modelos de fijación de precios de activos en dos y varios 
períodos. Obtendremos bid-ask spreads a partir de la ausencia de arbitraje y derivaremos el 
modelo CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
II. Contenido 
 
Primera semana: Equilibrio , Arbitraje y Valoración de Activos. Cap. 1-9 (RW) y Cap. 2 y 4 
(HR). 
Segunda semana: Riesgo, Carteras óptimas y Analisis de Media-Varianza. Cap 11-13;17-20 
(RW) y Cap. 3 (HR). 
Tercera semana: Modelo Multiperíodo. Cap. 21-24 (RW) y Cap. 5 (HR). 
III. Referencias 
 
1. (RW) "Principles of Financial Economics". Le Roy and Werner (2000). 
2. (HR) "Financial economics: A Concise Introduction to Classical and Behavioral Finance". 
Hens and Rieger (2010) . 
IV. Evaluación 
 
En este curso tendremos listas de ejercicios semanales y una prueba al final del curso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SÍLABO 
Curso: 
Introducción a 
la Economía 
Experimental 
Maestría en 
Economía 
 
Profesor: 
Francisco Galarza 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Descripción del curso 
 
Este curso ofrece una introducción a la economía experimental, rama de la economía que se 
ha desarrollado sustancialmente en las últimas décadas. Estos experimentos consisten en crear 
incentivos reales que son administrados en entornos controlados para probar teorías o estimar 
preferencias individuales y sociales. 
 
El objetivo del curso es familiarizarlos con la metodología y las principales herramientas que 
ofrece la economía experimental; así como discutir evidencia experimental empírica de temas 
seleccionados. Se busca también motivarlos para que puedan desarrollar sus propias ideas de 
experimentos. 
 
Los temas tratados incluyen: la utilidad y metodología de experimentos económicos; las 
preferencias por riesgo y temporales; juegos diseñados para medir confianza, reciprocidad y 
justicia; discriminación; juegos de bienes públicos; juegos de señalización; reputación; 
neuroeconomía; y experimentos en educación, salud y microfinanzas. 
II. Textos 
 
No hay libros de texto obligatorios, pero recomiendo los siguientes para los interesados 
(tomaremos secciones de ellos para algunas clases): 
 
Camerer, Colin F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
[BGT] 
 
Davis, Douglas and Charles Holt (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. [EE] 
 
Kagel, John H. and Alvin E. Roth (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. [HEE] 
 
Friedman, Daniel y Shyam Sunder (1994). Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. 
Cambridge University Press. [FS] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guala, Francesco (2005), The Methodology of Experimental Economics, Cambridge University 
Press. [FG] 
 
III. Requisitos del Curso 
 
Se espera que los alumnos lean los materiales antes de clase y participen activamente en la 
discusión. La evaluación del curso incluirá: participación en clase (15 %), una revisión 
crítica/presentación (25 %), y un trabajo final (60 %). 
 
La revisión crítica de uno de los artículos obligatorios indicados en el programa será individual, 
y consistirá en un ensayo de un máximo de 5 páginas (espacio simple). Los alumnos 
presentarán estos artículos a la clase y conducirán la discusión de los mismos. Los temas y 
fechas serán asignados a los primeros que los soliciten. Las presentaciones deberán ilustrar el 
objetivo y la motivación del artículo/paper, hacer una síntesis, presentar en detalle el diseño 
experimental, y analizar críticamente el paper (qué hicieron bien, qué pudieron mejorar, y qué 
sugerencias le harían a los autores). 
 
A su vez, el trabajo final deberá realizarse en parejas y consistirá en una propuesta formal de 
investigación de algún tema de su interés con un enfoque experimental. El trabajo deberá 
contener, como mínimo, una revisión de la literatura relevante existente sobre el tema a 
investigar, la pregunta de investigación, la hipótesis a probar, la justificación de la relevancia 
de estudiar dichapregunta, la metodología y el diseño experimental para generar los datos, y 
la forma cómo se analizarán los datos. Deberán entregar dos reportes preliminares de su 
trabajo final en fechas que serán indicadas al inicio del curso. 
IV. Contenido del curso 
 
Este es un esquema preliminar del contenido del curso. 
 
Lecturas marcadas con un asterisco (*) son obligatorias (deberán escoger una de las lecturas 
obligatorias para su revisión crítica); las demás son incluidas como referencia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introducción 
 
* Roth, Alvin, "Introduction to Experimental Economics," capítulo 1 en HEE. EE, 
"Introduction." 
Samuelson, Larry, 2005, “Economic Theory and Experimental Economics,"Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 43: 65-107. 
 
4.2. Metodología usada en la economía experimental 
 
* FS, capítulo 1. 
 
* Smith, V.L., 2002, "Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality,"Experimental 
Economics, 5: 91-110. 
 
Smith, V.L., 1994, “Economics in the Laboratory,"Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8: 
113-31. 
 
Smith, Vernon, 1982, "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,"American 
Eco-nomic Review, 72:5, 923-955. 
 
Smith, Vernon, 1976, “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory,"American 
Economic Review, 66, 274-279. 
 
4.3. Identificando preferencias individuales 
 
* Camerer, Colin, “Individual Decision Making,”cap. 8 en HEE. 
 
[1] Preferencias por riesgo 
 
* Camerer Colin F., 1989, .A n Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility 
Theories,"Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2: 61-104. 
 
* Kahneman, Daniel y Amos Tversky, 1979, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk,”Econometrica, 47:2, 263-291 
 
* Harless, D.W. y Colin Camerer, 1994, “The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected 
Utility Theories,”Econometrica, 62:6, 1251-1289. 
 
* Loomes, Graham y Robert Sugden, 1983, “A Rationale for Preference 
Reversals,”American Economic Review, 73:3, 428-432. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Holt, Charles y Susan Laury, 2002, “Risk Aversion and Incentive E¤ects”, American 
Eco-nomic Review, 92:5, 1644-1655. 
 
* Binswanger, Hans, 1980, “Attitudes Towards Risk: Experimental Measurement in 
Rural India,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62:3, 395-407. 
 
Chew, S.H. y W.S. Waller, 1986, “Empirical Tests of Weighted Utility Theory,” Journal 
of Mathematical Psychology, 30, 55-72. 
 
[2] Preferencias temporales 
 
* Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein y Ted O’Donoghue, 2002, “Time Discounting 
and Time Preference: A Critical Review,"Journal of Economic Literature, 40:2, 351-401. 
 
* Harrison, Glenn, Morten Lau, y Melonie Williams, 2002, “Estimating Individual 
Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment, ”American Economic Review, 92:5, 
1606-17. 
 
Anderson, Steffen, Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau y Elisabet Rustrom, 2008, “Eliciting Risk 
and Time Preferences,” Econometrica, 76:3, 583-618. 
 
Stephen Burks, Jeffrey Carpenter, Lorenz Goette y Aldo Rustichini, 2009, “Cognitive 
Skills Affect Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior and Job Attachment, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, May 12, 106:19, 7745-7750. 
 
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C., & Nguyen, Q., 2010, Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam, "American Economic Review, 
Forthcoming. 
 
[3] Anomalías y críticas 
 
* Harrison, Glenn, John List y Charles Towe, 2007, “Naturally Occurring Preferences 
and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of Risk Aversion,” Econometrica, 
75:2, 433-458. 
 
* List, John, 2003, “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? ”Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118:1, 41-71. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rabin, Matthew y Richard Thaler (2001), .Anomalies: Risk Aversion", Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 15, 219-232. 
 
Plott, Charles y Kathryn Zeiler, 2007, “Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as 
Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory,” American Economic 
Review, 97:4, 1449-1466. 
 
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein y Drazen Prelec, 2003, “’Coherent Arbitrariness’: Stable 
Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 73-105. 
 
4.4. Confianza, reciprocidad, y justicia 
 
4.4.1 Confianza y reciprocidad 
 
* Capítulo 2 en BGT. 
 
* McCabe, Kevin, Mary Rigdon y Vernon Smith. (2003) “Positive Reciprocity and 
Intentions in Trust Games,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53: 267-275. 
 
* Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut y Kevin McCabe, 1995, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social 
History,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1): 122-142 
 
 
* Cox, James C., 2004, “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity,” Games and Economic 
Behavior, 46(2): 260-281. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., et al., 2000, “Measuring Trust” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
15(3): 811-846.Schechter, Laura, 2007, “Traditional Trust Measurement and the Risk 
Confound: An Experiment in Rural Paraguay” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 62(2):272-292. 
 
Bohnet, Iris, Fiona Greig, Benedikt Herrmann y Richard Zeckhauser, 2008, “Betrayal 
Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States” 
American Economic Review, 98(1): 294-310. 
 
Eckel, Catherine y Ragan Petrie, 2009, “Face Value” Working Paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Karlan, Dean, 2005, “Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict 
Real Financial Decisions” American Economic Review, 95(5): 1688-1699. 
 
Karlan, Dean, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat y Adam Szeidl, 2008, “Trust and Social 
Collateral, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 
4.4.2 Justicia (fairness) 
 
* Fehr, Ernst y Klaus Schmidt, 1999, “Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3, 817-868. 
 
Bolton, Gary E. y Axel Ockenfels, 2000, “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Com-
petition,”American Economic Review, 90:1, 166-193. 
 
Rabin, Matthew, 1993, “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics” 
American Economic Review, 83:5, 1281-1302. 
 
Charness, Gary y Matthew Rabin, 2002, “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple 
Tests” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:3, 817-869. 
 
Cox, James, Daniel Friedman y Vjollca Sadirij, 2008, “Revealed Altruism,” Econometrica, 
76:1, 31-69. 
 
4.5 Discriminación, género y belleza 
 
 
* List, John A., 2004, “The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: 
Evidence from the Field,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119:1, 49-89. 
 
* Bertrand, M., y S. Mullainathan, 2004, “Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lak-
isha and Jamal: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination” American Economic 
Review, 94, 991-1013. 
 
* Mobius, Markus and Tanya Rosenblat, “Why Beauty Matters,”American Economic 
Review, 96(1): 222-235. 
 
Andreoni, James and Ragan Petrie, 2008, “Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
from Laboratory Experiments,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 73-93. 
 
Ayres, I. y P. Siegelman, 1995, “Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New 
Car” American Economic Review, 85(3): 304–323. 
 
Babcock, Linda, Michele Gelfand, Deborah Small y Heidi Stayn, 2006, “Gender Differences 
in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations, Social Psychology and Economics, 239-59. 
 
Castillo, Marco y Ragan Petrie, 2010, “Discrimination in the Lab: Does Information Trump 
Appearance?” Games and Economic Behavior, 68: 50-59. 
 
Croson, Rachel y Uri Gneezy, 2009, “Gender Differences in Preferences” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47:2, 448-474. 
 
Eckel, Catherine y Philip Grossman, 2008, “Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men 
and Women: Experimental Evidence” En: Plott, Charles y Vernon Smith, eds, Handbook of 
Experimental Economics Results, Volume 1, New York: North Holland Press. 
 
Fisman, Raymond, Sheena Iyengar, Emir Kamenica y Itamar Simonson, “Gender 
Differences in Mate Selection:Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 121(2): 673-697. 
 
4.6 Bienes públicos y cooperación 
 
* Ledyard, John, “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research” capítulo 2 en HEE. 
 
* Houser, Daniel y R. Kurzban, 2002, “Experiments investigating cooperative types in 
humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and simulations” PNAS February 1, 
2005,102(5): 1803-1807. 
 
* List, John A. y David Lucking-Reiley, 2002, “The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on 
Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign” Journal of 
Political Economy, 110:1, 215-233. 
 
Landry, Craig, Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price y Nicholas G. Rupp, 2006, 
"Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment, "Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121: 2, 747-782. 
 
Karlan, Dean y John List, “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-
Scale Natural Field Experiment” 2006, Working Paper. 
 
4.7 Señalización y reputación 
 
* Capítulo 8 en BGT. 
 
* Holt, Charles y Lisa Anderson, 1997, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory” American 
Economic Review, 87:5, 847-862. 
 
Camerer, Colin F., y K. Weigelt. 1988. Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium 
Reputation Model. "Econometrica, 56, 1-36. 
 
Çelen, B. y S. Kariv, 2003, "Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in 
the Laboratory" American Economic Review. 
 
Neral, John y Jack Ochs, 1992, “The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation 
Building: A Further Test” Econometrica, 60:5, 1151-69. 
 
Grosskopf, Brit y Rajiv Sarin, 2008, “Is Reputation Good or Bad?” Working Paper, Texas 
A&M. 
 
4.8 Neuroeconomía 
 
* Rustichini, Aldo, 2005, Neuroeconomics: Present and future. Games and Economic 
Behavior 52: 201-12. 
 
* Lee, D. (2008). "Game theory and neural basis of social decision making, "Nature 
Neuro-science 11: 404-409. 
 
McCabe, K. A. (2008), "Neuroeconomics and the economic sciences. Econ Philos 24: 345-
368. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Experimentos en educación, salud, microfinanzas 
 
* Banerjee, Abhijit V., Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, y Leigh Linden, 2007, “Remedying 
Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 122(3): 1235-1264. 
 
* Kremer, Michael y Edward Miguel (2004) “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Health and 
Education in the Presence of Treatment Externalities” Econometrica, 72(1): 159-217. 
 
* Bertrand, Marianne, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir y Jonathan Zinman, 
2010, “What’s Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing 
Field Experiment” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1): 263-305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SÍLABO 
Curso: 
Macroeconomía 
con Fricciones 
Maestría en 
Economía 
 
Profesor: 
Manuel Macera 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Descripción del curso 
 
Este es un curso intermedio en teoría macroeconómica cuyo propósito es introducir al alumno 
de una manera efectiva en un conjunto de modelos que guían la discusión macroeconómica 
moderna. La metodología a seguir consistirá en contrastar las predicciones de cada modelo 
con la evidencia para evaluar la calidad de las mismas. El punto de partida será la teoría de 
mercados completos, según la cual los consumidores tienen la posibilidad de diversificar 
completamente los riesgos que enfrentan. Se estudiarán las virtudes y deficiencias del modelo 
para generar estadísticos que sean consistentes con la evidencia económica. De este modo 
motivaremos las extensiones. Empezaremos con la teoría de mercados incompletos exógenos, 
la cual nos llevará naturalmente al estudio de economías con agentes heterogéneos. Luego 
estudiaremos cómo la presencia de fricciones más primitivas (limited enforcement, private 
information) son capaces de endogeneizar la naturaleza incompleta del mercado. En cada 
paso, reevaluaremos las predicciones de los modelos y discutiremos aplicaciones y 
extensiones. 
II. Requisitos 
 
El curso está dirigido a alumnos de maestría con conocimiento intermedio de teoría 
macroeconómica. La participación en el curso requiere un conocimiento elemental de 
programación dinámica y la habilidad de hacer pruebas matemáticas formales. El material 
presentado será en gran porcentaje autocontenido. No obstante, es recomendable que los 
alumnos estén familiarizados con las herramientas presentadas en los apéndices matemáticos 
M.F a M.N de Mas-Collel et al [20] y en la seccion 2.2 y el capítulo 3 de Sargent and Ljungqvist 
[19]. 
III. Método de evaluación 
 
Los alumnos serán evaluados de dos maneras. La primera consistirá en un set de problemas 
asignado en la quinta sesión pare entregar en la séptima sesión. La segunda consistirá en un 
examen final a rendirse en la última sesión. La nota final del curso será el promedio simple de 
estas dos asignaciones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Contenido 
 
El curso está dividido en cuatro partes o módulos. El objetivo es cubrir la mayor cantidad de 
material posible. El detalle de cada módulo se da a continuación: 
 
 
1. Mercados Completos 
 
A. Un prototipo de economía - definición de equilibrio y análisis de eficiencia -B. 
Economías con mercados secuenciales.- Equivalencias - C. Predicciones y evidencia - 
 
* Referencias Bibliográficas: capítulo 8 y 13 de Sargent & Ljungqvist [19], Notas de 
Clase; otros: capítulo 1 y 2 de [26]. 
 
 
4.3. Mercados incompletos exógenos 
 
El problema de las fluctuaciones en el ingreso - formulación recursiva – B. Economias con 
mercados incompletos - definición y cómputo del equilibrio. – C. Predicciones y 
aplicaciones - D. Referencias Bibliográficas: capítulos 16 y 17 de Sargent & Ljungqvist 
[19], Notas de Clase, otros: [2], [3], [11], [7], [29], [24]. 
 
4.4. Mercados incompletos endógenos I 
 
A. Economías con limited enforcement - Digresión sobre métodos recursivos. – B. El 
problema de la asignación eficiente de recursos. – C. Descentralizando la asignación 
eficiente de recursos como un equilibrio de mercado - D. Predicciones y aplicaciones - E. 
Referencias Bibliográficas: capítulos 19 y 20 de Sargent & Ljungqvist [19], Notas de 
Clase, otros: [12], [13], [15], [5], [6], [17], [18], [4]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Mercados incompletos endógenos II 
 
A. Economías con información asimétrica – B. El problema de la asignación eficiente de 
recursos. - C. Implicancias para la distribución del ingreso - D. Predicciones y aplicaciones 
- E. Referencias Bibliográficas: capítulo 19 de Sargent & Ljungqvist [19], Notas de Clase, 
otros: [10], [21], [28], [27], [25], [22], [23], [8], [14]. 
V. Notas de clase 
 
Las notas de clase serán una bitácora de lo avanzado en el aula y la principal fuente de 
consulta. El complemento fundamental para las notas será Sargent & Ljungqvist [19]. Muchos 
de los tópicos a tratar serán papers que estarán resumidos parcialmente ya sea en los textos o 
en las notas. Durante la clase se hará referencia a estos documentos, los cuales figuran en la 
bibliografía y cuya lectura no es obligatoria. 
VI. Bibliografía 
 
[1] S. R. Aiyagari. Macroeconomics with frictions. Quarterly Review, (Sum):24–40, 1994. 
 
[2] S. R. Aiyagari. Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109(3):pp. 659–684, 1994. 
 
[3] S. R. Aiyagari. Optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets, borrowing 
constraints, and constant discounting. The Journal of Political Economy, 103(6):pp. 1158–
1175, 1995. 
[4] R. Albuquerque and H. A. Hopenhayn. Optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics. 
Review of Economic Studies, 71(2):285–315, 04 2004. 
 
[5] F. Alvarez and U. J. Jermann. Eficiency, equilibrium,and asset pricing with risk of default. 
Econometrica, 68(4):pp. 775–797, 2000. 
 
[6] F. Alvarez and U. J. Jermann. Quantitative asset pricing implications of endogenous 
solvency constraints. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(4):pp. 1117–1151, 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[7] T. Bewley. The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 16(2):252–292, December 1977. 
[8] G. L. Clementi and H. A. Hopenhayn. A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):229–265, 02 2006. 
 
[9] H. L. Cole and N. R. Kocherlakota. Eficient allocations with hidden income and hidden 
storage. Review of Economic Studies, 68(3):523–42, July 2001. 
 
[10] E. J. Green. Lending and smoothing of uninsurable income. in Contractual Arrange-ments 
for Intertemporal Trade, 1987. 
 
[11] M. Huggett. The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17(5-6):953–969, 1993. 
 
[12] T. J. Kehoe and D. K. Levine. Debt-constrained asset markets. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 60(4):pp. 865–888, 1993. 
 
[13] T. J. Kehoe and D. K. Levine. Liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained 
markets. Econometrica, 69(3):pp. 575–598, 2001. 
 
[14] N. Kocherlakota and L. Pistaferri. Asset pricing implications of pareto optimality with 
private information. Journal of Political Economy, 117(3):555–590, 06 2009. 
 
[15] N. R. Kocherlakota. Implications of eficient risk sharing without commitment. The Review 
of Economic Studies, 63(4):pp. 595–609, 1996. 
 
[16] N. R. Kocherlakota. The effects of moral hazard on asset prices when financial markets 
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economists. Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(1):1–14, January 2010. 
 
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 SÍLABO 
Curso: 
Forecasting 
and Forecast 
Evaluation 
 
Maestría en 
Economía 
 
Profesor: 
Roberto Duncan 
 
 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Objective 
 
 
The course will have two parts. First, we will review techniques to forecast time series and 
discuss recent advances in forecasting. Second, we will use forecasts to evaluate competing 
macroeconomic models. 
II. Contents 
 
1. Introduction and overview 
 
2. A quick primer/review on Gauss/Matlab 
 
3. Univariate time series 
- Forecasting univariate ARMA models 
- Direct vs. iterated multistep predictions 
- Stationary processes and the Wold decomposition 
- Unit autoregressive roots and ARIMA processes 
- Forecasting univariate ARIMA processes 
 
4. Multivariate time series and forecasting 
- Vector processes 
- Granger causality 
- Unit roots and cointegration 
 
5. Review of the central limit theorem, and long-run variance estimation 
- Standard results, i.i.d. data 
- Mean prediction error (MPE) and Mean Squared Prediction Error (MSPE) from random walk 
(RW) model, one step ahead predictions 
- Standard results, serially correlated data 
- Estimation of long run variance 
- Application: MPE and MSPE from forward rate model, one step ahead predictions 
 
6. Comparison of a small number of non-nested models 
- DMW tests when no model relies on estimated regression parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Estimated regression parameters, nonnested models, and asymptotic irrelevance 
- Corrections for parameter estimation error 
- Loss functions, utility functions, measures of predictive accuracy 
- Assumptions and limitations of West (1996) 
- Informal derivation of basic asymptotic result, for mean prediction error 
- Estimation of the asymptotic variance (V*) 
- Truncated and Hodrick-West parametric and Newey-West nonparametric estimators of V* 
 
8. Comparison of two nested models 
- McCracken and Clark-McCracken asymptotic results 
- MSPE adjusted, null model is martingale difference 
- MSPE adjusted, null model relies on estimated regression parameters to make predictions 
- Empirical applications/examples: Clark and West (2007); Molodstova and Papell (2007) 
- MSPE adjusted when there are more than two models 
- Chao, Corradi and Swanson statistic and out-of-sample Granger causality 
 
9. Simulation procedures to compare models 
- Application based on Clark and West (2005) 
- Bootstrap versus conventional asymptotics 
- Example: Clark and McCracken (2006) 
 
10. Comparison of a large number of models 
- Reality check test, reality check empirical tables 
 
III. Basic References 
 
Clements, M. and David F. Hendry (1999). Forecasting Non-Stationary Economic Time Series. 
MIT Press. 
 
Diebold, F. 2004. Elements of Forecasting. South-Western Press. 
 
Granger, White and Kamstra. 1989. “Interval Forecasting: An Analysis Based Upon ARCH-
Quantile Estimators,” Journal of Econometrics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hamilton, James. 1994. Time series analysis, Princeton University Press. 
 
Stock and Watson. 2003. “How did leading indicator forecasts perform during the 2001 
recession?”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly. 
 
Stock and Watson. 2007. “Why has U.S. inflation become harder to forecast?”. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking. 
 
Stock and Watson. 2008. “Phillips curve inflation forecasts,” working paper. 
 
West, K. (2006) “Forecast Evaluation,” 100-134 in Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Vol. 1, 
G. 
 
Elliott, C. Granger and A. Timmerman (eds), Amsterdam: Elsevie. 
 
IV. Other articles and books 
 
Meese and Rogoff (JIE, 1983); Pagan and Schwert (JoE, 1990); Fair and Shiller (AER 1990); 
West, 
Edison and Cho (JIE, 1993); Newey-West (Econometrica 1987, ReStud 1994); Andrews 
(Econometrica 1991); Pagan and Hall (Econometrics Reviews 1983); Davidson and MacKinnon 
(IER 1984, Econometric Theory 1989); Wooldridge (Econometric Theory 1990); McCracken 
(2004); Clark and McCracken (J. Econometrics 2001, Econometric Reviews 2005), Handbook of 
Economic Forecasting(2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SÍLABO 
Curso: Tópicos 
Microeconómicos 
del Desarrollo 
Maestría en Economía 
 
Profesor: 
Fernando Aragón 
 
 
 
Ciclo: 3er. ciclo 
Créditos: 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This course is an introduction to the main issues in growth and development. The course 
focuses mainly on development from a micro perspective. We will, however, also discuss the 
big macro-economic picture. The reason for this is twofold. First, we need to understand the 
environment where economic activity takes place. Many debates and questions in micro 
development echoes similar issues brought forward first by macro studies. Second, the line 
between macro and micro issues, in practice, is not very clear. 
 
The course has a strong bias towards empirical work. As part of the course, students are 
expected to develop and exercise their ability to assess the merits and limitations of the 
empirical evidence. Hence a reasonable background on applied econometrics is a prerequisite. 
That said, the empirical focus does not imply disregard for economic theory. We will study 
several economic models that will provide us with a framework to interpret the empirical 
results and ask additional questions. 
 
 
 
The starting point of the lectures is the observation that economic growth lies at the heart of 
economic development. We first discuss the macro economic factors (such as capital 
accumulation and institutions) and its contribution to economic performance. Then, we move 
towards microeconomic and policy issues such as agriculture and land reform, industrial 
organization, property rights, infrastructure, education and health, microfinance, natural 
resources and governance. 
 
II. Assignments and Grading 
 
The course consists of nine 3-hour lectures scheduled over 3 weeks. Students are expected to 
read in advance the suggested readings and participate in class. Class participation will 
account for 10% of the final grade. 
 
In addition, there will be a final written essay. The essay should discuss critically the literature 
of a topic studied in class. Students are free to choose the topic they prefer from the course 
 
 
 
 
 
 
outline (see below). The essay should be individual, original work and have a maximum of 5 
single-spaced pages. The deadline of the essay and submission guidelines will be discussed at 
the beginning of the course. The essay grade accounts for 40% of the final grade. 
 
The rest of the final grade (50%) will consist of a final, comprehensive exam. 
 
Participation 10%
Written essay 40%
Final Exam 50%
 
III. Course outline and reading list 
 
Suggested reading is marked with a star (*). 
 
Lecture 1: Overview 
 
We start with a brief history of development policy and experience, and the current big issues. 
We look at the data and the main features of developing countries, and provide an overview of 
the methods to quantify economic progress, measure poverty and well being. We also review 
the main econometric issues relevant for empirical development. 
 
• * Angrist, Joshua D. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke (2009), “Mostly 
Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion”, Chapter 2 and 3 
 
• Sen, Amartya (1986), ”The Concept of Development”. Chapter 2 in Hollis 
Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, (eds) Handbook of Development Economics, Volume I. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
2. * Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo, (2007), ”The Economic Lives of the Poor”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 141-167 
 
3. Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2003) ‘Halving Global Poverty.’ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17(3), 3-22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Caselli, Francesco (2005) ‘Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences.’ Handbook 
of Economic Growth. Available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif/papers/handbook.pdf 
 
5. World Bank (2008), ”World Development Report”, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_ book.pdf 
 
Lecture 2: Physical and Human Capital 
 
Review of neoclassical growth model. One of the main reasons why some countries are poor is 
that they lack the physical and human capital necessary to produce. We consider the theory 
behind this and look at the evidence. 
 
• * Mankiw, Gregory, David Romer and David Weil (1992) ‘A Contribution to the Empirics 
of Economic Growth.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407-38. 
 
• De Long, Brad and Larry Summers (1991) ‘Equipment Investment and Economic 
Growth.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 445-502. 
 
• Young, Alwyn (1995) ‘The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Re-ality of the East 
Asian Growth Experience.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 110. 
 
• Krueger, Alan B. and Mikael Lindhal (2001) ‘Education for Growth: Why and For Whom?’ 
Journal of Economic Literature 34(4), 1101- 1136 
 
 
Lecture 3: Institutions 
 
A new wave of research now sees institutions as key to understand differences between 
countries. We discuss the economic definition of institutions and how they may shape the 
pattern of development. We look at macro and micro empirical evidence for the claim that 
institutions are important. 
 
• Acemoglu and Daron Johnson (2005) ”Unbundling Institutions”, Journal of 
Political Economy 113(5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Acemoglu, Daron Johnson, Simon; James A. Robinson (2005) ”Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Economic Growth”, Handbook of Economic Growth. 
 
• Acemoglu, Daron Johnson, Simon; James A. Robinson (2001) ”The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review 
91(5), 1369-1401. 
 
• Angrist, Joshua D. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke (2009), “Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An 
Empiricist’s Companion”, Chapter 4 
 
• Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer 
(2004) ”Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/political2.5_complete_b.pdf 
 
• Hall, Robert and Charles Jones, (1999), ”Why do some countries Produce so Much More 
Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 114, 83-116 
 
• Nunn, Nathan (2009), ”The Importance of History for Economic Development”, Annual 
Review of Economics, p. 65-92, available at 
http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/files/Nunn_ARE_ 2009.pdf 
 
• Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, (1997) Factor Endowments, 
Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View 
from Economic Historians of the United States, in Stephen Harber, ed., How Latin 
America Fell Behind, Stan- ford University Press, Stanford, pp. 260304. 
 
• Pande, Rohini and Christopher Udry (2006) ”Institutions and Development: A View from 
Below”, available at http://www.cemmap.ac.uk/papers/vol2_chap14.pdf 
 
• Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), ”History, Institutions, and Economic 
Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India”, The American 
Economic Review 95(4). 
 
Lecture 4: Property rights 
 
The need to establish and enforce systems of property rights is frequently discussed as a key 
 
 
 
 
 
 
component of development strategy. We discuss the channels for property rights to affect 
economic performance. We also discuss empirical studies of the effect of strengthening 
property rights. 
 
• *Besley, T. (1995), ”Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory 
and 
• Evidence from Ghana.” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 5, p. 903-937 
 
• De Soto, Hernando, [2001], ”The Mystery of Capital,” Finance and De-velopment, IMF, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/desoto.htm• Field, Erica and Maximo Torero, [2004], ”Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access 
Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program,” available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/papers/FieldTorerocs.pdf 
 
• * Field, Erica (2002), ”Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in 
Peru”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, Nr. 4, pp. 1561-1602 
 
 
Lecture 5: Industrial organization in developing countries 
 
Two commonly cited problems for low levels of industrial investment in developing countries 
are costly contracting and uncertainty. In this lecture we study how industrial organization in 
developing countries respond to these problem, focusing on the importance of reputation, 
subcontracting and long-term relations with buyers in developed countries. 
 
• * Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo, ”Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A study 
of the Indian Software Industry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115 (3), pp. 989-
1017, 2000. 
 
• Fontenay, C. (2004): ”The dual role of market power in the Big Push: from Evidence to 
Theory”, Journal of Development Economics, Volume 75, Issue 1. 
 
• Macchiavello, R. (2009), ”The Organization of Exports in a Growing Industry: Chilean 
Wine in the UK”, mimeo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Murphy, K., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1989), ”Industrialization and the Big Push” 
Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1003-1026. 
 
• Andrabi, T., M. Ghatak, and A. I. Khwaja, (2006). ”Subcontractors for Tractors: Theory 
and Evidence on Flexible Specialization, Supplier Selection, and Contracting”, Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 79, Issue 2. 
 
 
Lecture 6: Education and health 
 
Improving educational and health outcomes is at the heart of many development strategies. A 
main challenge, however, is to identify which policy interventions are more effective on 
improving these outcomes. In this lecture, we discuss empirical evidence assessing this issue, 
mostly drawn from recent field experiments. 
 
• Banerjee, A.; E. Duflo and R. Glennester, (2008) "Putting a Band-Aid on 
a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System", JEEA 6(2-3) 
 
• * Duflo, E. (2001), "Schooling and Labour Market Consequences of School 
Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment", American 
Economic Review, 91 (4), pp 795-813 
 
• Banerjee, Abhijit V., Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, Leigh Linden (2007),"Remedying 
Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 122(3), 1235-1264 
 
• Dupas, Pascaline, Do Teenagers Respond to HIV Risk Information? Evidence from a 
Field Experiment in Kenya (February 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14707. 
 
• Evans, D.; M. Kremer and M. Ngatia (2009), "The Impact of Distributing School 
Uniforms on Children's education in Kenya", mimeo 
 
• Glewwe P, Kremer M, Moulin S, Zitzewitz E. 2004. Retrospective vs. prospective 
analyses of school inputs: the case of flip charts in Kenya. J. Dev. Econ. 74(1):25168 
 
• Glewwe P, Kremer M, Moulin S. 2009. Many children left behind? Textbooks and test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
scores in Kenya. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 1:11235 
 
• Kremer, Michael and Edward Miguel, (2004), "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education 
and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities", Econometrica. 
 
• Kremer, Michael; Edward Miguel, Rebecca Thornton (2009), "Incentives to Learn", 
Review of Economics and Statistics 91:3, 437-456 
 
• Kremer, Michael, Sylvie Moulin, and Robert Namunyu, Unbalanced Decentralization: 
Results of a Randomized School Supplies Provision Program in Kenya, Mimeo Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C., November 2002. 
 
• * Kremer, Michael, (2004), "Randomized Evaluations of Educational Programs in 
Developing Countries: Some Lessons", American Economic Review (Papers and 
Proceedings). 
 
• Krueger, Alan B. and Mikael Lindhal (2001), "Education for Growth: Why and For 
Whom?", Journal of Economic Literature, 34(4), 1101-1136. 
 
• Muralidharan, Karthik and Sundararaman, Venkatesh, Teacher Performance Pay: 
Experimental Evidence from India (September 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15323. 
 
• Schultz, T. Paul. "School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa 
Poverty Program." Journal of Development Economics, 2004 
 
• Hanna, Rema and Esther Duflo (2006), "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to 
School", mimeo 
 
 
Lecture 7: Micro finance 
 
In recent years, there has been a boom on projects aimed to broaden access to credit to 
populations excluded from traditional financial markets. This policy has been aimed to provide 
those who have talents and skills but not money, to undertake investments, and also to 
empower disadvantaged groups. We study the main characteristics of micro finance projects 
and discuss the empirical evidence of their impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Coleman, B. (1999), "The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand", 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 60 : pp 105-141 
 
• Field, Erica and Rohini Pande (2008) "Repayment Frequency and Default in 
Microfinance: Evidence From India", Journal of the European Economic Association 6(2-
3) 
 
• Ghatak, Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guinnane (1999), "The Economics of Lending with 
Joint Liability: Theory and Practice" Journal of Development Economics, Vol.60, No. 1. 
Working Paper No. 4008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9315628 
 
• Gin, Xavier and Karlan, Dean S., Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in 
the Philippines (September 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research 
 
4.3.4. de Mel, Suresh; David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff, (2008) "Returns to 
Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a field experiment", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 123(4). 
 
4.3.5. Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2007), "Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized 
Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts", 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp956.pdf 
 
4.3.6. Karlan and Jonathan Zinman (2008) "Credit Elasticities in Less Developed 
Countries: Implications for Microfinance", American Economic Review, 98(3) 1040-1068 
 
4.3.7. Karlan, D. and J. Zinman, J., (2009) "Observing Unobservables: Identifying 
Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment", Econometrica 
77(6) 
 
4.3.8. * Morduch, J. (1999), “The Microfinance Promise”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 37, pp. 1569-1614 
 
4.3.9. * Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, R. Glennester and C. Kinnan (2009), "The miracle of 
microfinance? Evidence from a randomized evaluation", mimeo, 
http://www.povertylab.com/papers/102_Duflo_Spandana_Microlending.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lecture 8: Natural resources 
 
Primary industries, like mining or oil extraction, are still important economic activities in 
developing countries. A key question is how to transform this resource abundance into an 
engine for development. We discuss the theoretical arguments for natural resource to affect 
economic development and look at the new empirical evidence. 
 
• * Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew Warner (2001) "The Curse of 
Natural Resources", European Economic Review 45, 827-838 
 
• Aragon, F. and J.P. Rud (2010), "Natural Resources and Local 
Economic Development: Evidence from a Peruvian Gold Mine", mimeo. 
 
• Caselli, F. (2006), "Power Struggles and the Natural Resource Curse", mimeo, available 
at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif/papers/curse.pdf 
 
• Torvik, Ragnar (2002), "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare" Journal of 
Development Economics 67, 455-470. 
 
• Michael, Guy (2007). “The Long-Term Consequences of Resource-Based Specialization”, 
mimeo, available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/michaels/Michaels_Specialization.pdf• Black, Dan; Terra McKinnish and Seth Sanders (2005), “The Economic Impact of the 
coal boom and bust”, Economic Journal, 115(503), pp. 449-476 
 
• * Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik (2006), "Institutions and the Resource 
Curse," Economic Journal, 116(508), 1-20. 
 
 
Lecture 9: Governance and corruption 
 
Much stress is now placed on good government as a key element of effective development. 
We discuss incentives for the government to respond to population demands, and discuss 
evidence on corruption and its effect on development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Bardhan, Pranab (1997), “Corruption and Development: a review of issues”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol 35. 
 
• Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee, (2000), "Capture and Governance at Local and 
National Levels", American Economic Review, 90 (2), 135-39. 
 
• Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002), "The Political Economy of Government 
Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
117(4), 1415-1452. 
 
• Chattopadhay,R. and Duflo, E. (2004), "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from 
Randomized Policy Experiment in India". Econometrica, 72(5) 
 
• Svensson, Jakob, (2003), "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from 
Cross-Section of Firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1) 
 
• Triesman, Daniel, (2000), "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study", Journal 
of Public Economics, 76, 399-457 
 
• Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2008). “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of 
Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
123(2) 
 
• Brollo, Fernanda; Tommaso Nannicini; Roberto Perotti and Guido Tabellini, (2010), “The 
Political Resource Curse”, NBER Working Paper w15705 
 
• Bertrand, Marianne; Simeon Djankov; Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2007), 
“Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach