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Alberto Ruiz Ojeda
Remedios Zamora Roselló
(Eds. Lits.)
Regulación y competencia 
en SeRvicioS de inteRéS 
económico geneRal (Sieg): 
análiSiS SectoRialeS y 
compaRativoS
univeRSidad de málaga / deBateS
20
© Los autores
©	Publicaciones	y	Divulgación	Científica.	Vicerrectorado	de	Investigación
 y Transferencia de la Universidad de Málaga
Diseño de colección: M.ª Luisa Cruz
Maquetación: Aurora Álvarez Narváez
ISBN:	978-84-9747-XXX-X
Depósito	Legal:	MA-XXX/20XX
Imprime:	XXXX
Esta obra también está disponible en formato electrónico
dedicatoria?????
7
Presentación
La actividad administrativa redistribuidora: 
lo viejo y lo muy viejo
Alberto Ruiz Ojeda
La reflexión sobre la actuación de las Administraciones públicas en los varia-
dísimos ámbitos de producción e intercambio de bienes y servicios es una parte 
relevante, desde hace mucho tiempo —por no decir que desde los mismos 
comienzos—, del trabajo de los científicos sociales, muy destacadamente de 
los iuspublicistas. Estoy convencido de que la cuestión fundamental que debe-
mos responder, en sus variadas facetas, es la de porqué las Administraciones 
públicas actúan en el ámbito de la economía ya que, con esto, damos con el 
núcleo de su régimen jurídico y de sus soportes institucionales. Las maneras 
de enfocar esa cuestión son tan diversas como legítimas y útiles, a condición 
de que vayan dirigidas a proporcionar claves causales y, de hecho, lo consigan. 
Como estoy obligado a ser breve en esta Presentación, diré de inmediato que, 
para mí, la principal causa de la actuación de la Administración en el ámbito 
económico es la redistribución de rentas y, si se me permite la puntualización, 
que tal redistribución puede denominarse intencional, en el sentido de que 
resulta dirigida, orientada a beneficiar a ciertos sujetos con lo que se detrae 
a otros. Esto que acabo de decir puede considerarse como algo tan obvio que 
resulta casi despreciable, pero despreciar lo obvio, al menos por ese simple 
hecho, no suele ser bueno.
La redistribución o reasignación de recursos es una función propia del 
mercado, pero sus efectos no son controlables a priori, es decir, no son in-
tencionales. El mercado reasigna recursos con eficiencia, procura tanto la 
aplicación correcta de factores económicos ociosos o mal empleados como 
la desaparición o abandono de aquellos que no proporcionan utilidad. No es 
fácil	encontrar	una	explicación	más	certera	que	la	que	dio	J.	A.	Schumpeter:	el	
mercado es un proceso de destrucción creativa. Las reacciones ante una verdad 
tan demoledora han alcanzado intensidades y formas muy variadas, pero hace 
tiempo ya que se agruparon en torno a la definición del papel de las Adminis-
8
traciones públicas en la economía, y a ellas se confía la misión de redistribuir 
y, en definitiva, de corregir, sustituir o complementar —todo esto junto o por 
separado, según el sesgo que se asigne a la misión— los efectos redistributivos 
del mercado en función del ya mencionado componente intencional. Dentro 
de ese conjunto de tareas con finalidad redistributiva hay una que no debe pa-
sar inadvertida aunque vaya implícita: la de promover el buen funcionamien-
to del mercado, no sólo porque se protejan sus componentes esenciales sino 
porque positivamente se busque reforzar el mercado en términos funcionales 
u operativos. La tutela de la competencia, la buena regulación, la mejora de 
la gobernanza económica, son pabellones sobradamente conocidos. Todos los 
empeños a los que me acabo de referir genéricamente han tenido derivaciones 
muy prolijas en el pensamiento y en el comportamiento, y muchas de ellas 
responden a una idea que tiene bastante de utopía: aprovechar las formidables 
capacidades reales del mercado al tiempo que se palian sus efectos menos de-
seables. Esto plantea un programa de trabajo imponente, además de un desafío 
ético que, visto en términos aristotélicos, tiene inevitables connotaciones po-
líticas: entramos en el terreno de lo valorativo, de lo bueno y de lo equitativo, 
o sea, de lo justo, y la justicia sólo puede concebirse socialmente. En esencia, 
toda reflexión sobre la actuación administrativa y sus encarnaduras organiza-
tivas e instrumentos institucionales no hace otra cosa que masticar e intentar 
digerir intelectualmente una parte indispensable de la acción colectiva. Para 
mí, la regulación, en su sentido técnico estricto, no es otra cosa que el con-
junto de instituciones —que consisten en pautas jurídicas de ordenación de 
transacciones y procesos productivos— de acción colectiva de naturaleza no 
impositiva o, por decirlo aseverativamente, regular es redistribuir mediante 
equidistribución, o sea, a través de un reparto de beneficios y cargas en el seno 
de un grupo. Como regla general —que, en cuanto tal, necesita excepciones 
que la confirmen— ningún bien, ningún recurso, ninguna actividad es, por sí 
misma, pública o privada, de manera que es el instrumento a través del cual 
se lleva a cabo su producción, intercambio, mantenimiento o aprovechamiento 
(no las cualidades intrínsecas del bien, del recurso o de la actividad) el que 
determina,	por	sí	mismo,	su	carácter	público	o	privado.	Según	me	parece	más	
adecuado, habría que hablar, por una parte, de bienes, recursos y actividades 
provistas mediante instituciones de acción colectiva y, por otra, de las provis-
tas	mediante	 instituciones	de	acción	no-colectiva.	Entre	unas	 instituciones	y	
otras no sólo no hay una separación tajante, sino que existe una dinámica de 
recíproca y constante influencia, tan intensa e íntima que permite hablar de 
una interactuación conformativa: no es posible entender la acción colectiva sin 
la	 constante	 referencia	a	 la	 acción	no-colectiva,	y	viceversa.	Las	 soluciones	
9
intelectualmente sencillas suelen resultar molestas, y la que acabo de exponer 
podría ser una de ellas.
La redistribución entendida de esta guisa, sea en versión impositiva, sea en 
versión regulatoria, hace patentes dos cosas: en primer lugar que los derechos 
de propiedad —vistos como el legítimo disfrute de utilidades— no son tales 
sin la acción colectiva y, en segundo lugar, que la acción colectiva necesita 
la referencia legitimadora de la autonomía de la voluntad. No puede haber 
impuesto sin representación, como tampoco puede haber regulación sin legiti-
mación. Pero, en el caso de la regulación, ¿de qué legitimación hablamos? De 
una legitimación análoga —en parte igual, en parte distinta— a la impositiva, 
a la que se asemeja en cuanto que las instituciones regulatorias replican de 
manera incompleta, ficticia, tácita, un acuerdo voluntario, del que se diferencia 
en cuanto a las técnicas específicas que emplea. El impuesto, como magis-
tralmente	recordó	Villar	Palasí,	no	es	otra	cosa	que	un	precio (pretium pacis 
emptae) y las tarifas de los servicios prestados mediante concesión no son más 
que precios fijados por un contrato del que los usuarios no son parte.
Debo aclarar que los estudios que componen esta obra consisten en las 
contribuciones	presentadas	en	el	Congreso	Internacional	sobre	Regulación	y	
Competencia	en	Servicios	de	Interés	Económico	General,	que	tuvo	lugar	en	la	
Universidad	de	Málaga	los	días	23	y	24	de	noviembre	de	2012,	organizado	por	
el	Grupo	 de	 Investigación	 sobre	 Sectores	 Económicos	Regulados	 (GISER),	
con la colaboración de la Cátedra de Política de Competencia de dicha Uni-
versidad. Los autores han tenido la paciencia de reelaborar y completar sus 
trabajos para la publicación que ahora culmina. Lo que acabo de decir no sólo 
informa sobre los orígenes de este volumen, sino que nos sitúa ante uno de los 
sortilegios más recientes y de más rápido arraigo en la literatura legal moderna 
como	es	la	noción	misma	de	SIEG,	que	adquiere	carta	de	naturaleza	legal	ni	
más	ni	menos	que	de	la	mano	del	art.	106	del	Tratado	de	Funcionamientode	
la Unión Europea, para fijar el perímetro de actividades donde las Adminis-
traciones públicas de los Estados miembros pueden introducir excepciones al 
juego de la competencia en los mercados. De ahí que analizar y discutir cómo 
se	entreveran	la	regulación	y	la	competencia	en	los	SIEG	y	qué	límites	pueden	
tener los poderes públicos en esos ámbitos sean tareas prioritarias.
El	ensayo	que	abre	la	serie	es	el	del	Profesor	Galligan	y	se	corresponde	
con la Ponencia de cabecera del mencionado Congreso. He preferido mantener 
la versión inglesa y sin traducción que la acompañe para respetar al máximo 
la frescura de un texto de enorme interés que, si no me equivoco, resume a la 
perfección y con carácter auténtico una parte muy importante de las contribu-
10
ciones a la teoría de la regulación de un autor maduro y de trayectoria intelec-
tual	sobresaliente.	Galligan	hace	una	explicación	de	dos	de	los	componentes	
esenciales de la regulación, la legitimidad (aquiescencia) y la coordinación, al 
tiempo que sugiere que los estándares de conducta —un concepto particular-
mente querido por la mejor literatura jurídica anglosajona— son las normas 
indispensables para entender el sentido de la discrecionalidad de los regulado-
res, problema este último al que se le ha prestado también una notable atención 
en	la	doctrina	regulatoria	española,	entre	otros,	por	M.	Bacigalupo	Saggese	y	
A.	Betancor	Rodríguez.
La estructura del resto de la obra responde a lo indicado por su infratítulo, 
de	manera	que	los	aspectos	transversales	de	los	SIEG	se	ubican	en	el	primer	
epígrafe para dejar los sucesivos a los de carácter sectorial u horizontal.
Muy destacable me parece el estudio de Méndez Reátegui y Alosilla Díaz, 
dedicado a relatarnos la experiencia de una Autoridad de vigilancia de la com-
petencia y a darnos cuenta de los resultados que se obtienen con la aplicación 
de la metodología del Análisis Económico del Derecho en su vertiente —es 
importante señalar esto— australiana que, para decirlo muy simplificadamen-
te, se halla cerca de los postulados de la Economía Austriaca y, consiguiente-
mente, alejada de la Neoclásica. Esto otorga mayor interés aún al trabajo, ya 
que la orientación austriaca no es común en la metodología del Análisis Eco-
nómico del Derecho. Todavía algunos consideran osado, e incluso peligroso, 
incorporar el Análisis Económico del Derecho para el estudio de la competen-
cia y de la regulación, sobre todo porque pondría en evidencia tantos dislates 
perpetrados en aplicación de ese estado de la mente que conocemos con el 
nombre de interés general. El más que robusto ensayo de Méndez y Alosilla 
pone de manifiesto que, sin menoscabo de aproximaciones institucionales con-
vencionales —que siempre serán indispensables—, el Análisis Económico del 
Derecho proporciona resultados excelentes y, naturalmente, discutibles.
André	Saddy,	por	su	parte,	hace	una	meritoria	aportación	a	la	nutrida	línea	
de reflexiones sobre la textura normativa de los códigos de buenas prácticas y 
su papel en diferentes niveles, desde la autorregulación hasta la configuración 
de	los	controles	de	la	actividad	de	las	Administraciones	públicas.	Sobre	la	base	
de sus estudios previos sobre la discrecionalidad y la apreciatividad adminis-
trativas y un buen dominio de los conceptos jurídicos básicos —también en 
clave	de	culturas	jurídicas	comparadas—,	Saddy	nos	introduce	en	el	mundo	de	
lo paranormativo, si se me permite la expresión, para explorar criterios de dis-
cernimiento acerca de la vinculación de la Administración con los precedentes 
que ella misma ha sentado o la funcionalidad del así llamado soft law.
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La	visión	de	Javier	Porras	Belarra	sobre	los	antecedentes	más	inmediatos	
y	la	reciente	evolución	de	los	SIEG	en	el	Derecho	y	en	las	líneas	de	políticas	
públicas	de	la	Unión	Europea	me	parece	valiosa	y	meritoria.	Su	ensayo,	ade-
más,	dirige	nuestra	atención	sobre	el	núcleo	fundante	de	la	noción	de	SIEG,	no	
sólo	por	el	análisis	que	ofrece	del	propio	art.	106	TFUE	sino,	sobre	todo,	por	su	
exploración de las aplicaciones de este precepto y la sabrosa crítica que hace a 
las idas y venidas de la jurisprudencia del TJUE y de las propias decisiones de 
la Comisión Europea, que ponen de manifiesto, a su juicio, la tensión tremen-
da,	extenuante,	que	el	Estado	del	Bienestar	obliga	a	mantener	constantemente	
para equilibrar el funcionamiento del mercado. Tampoco se echarán de menos 
aquí interesantes reflexiones basadas en el Análisis Económico de las institu-
ciones del Derecho público.
En	su	breve	estudio,	María	Luisa	Gómez	Jiménez	afronta	una	de	las	pro-
longaciones	más	escurridizas	de	los	SIEG:	los	servicios sociales. A mi modes-
to entender, su acierto en el enfoque es doble, ya que no sólo se plantea hasta 
dónde puede restringirse en línea de principio el alcance prestacional de la 
actividad de las Administraciones Públicas sino también cómo diseñar técnicas 
más eficientes que, en un mundo de recursos escasos, constituye un imperativo 
irrenunciable de las políticas públicas y por tanto, exigible jurídicamente. Las 
referencias	de	 la	 autora	a	 la	Directiva	Bolkestein	 son	un	complemento	muy	
oportuno	para	 entrever	 la	 relación	de	 los	SIEG	con	 entornos	de	 actividades	
productivas no considerados formalmente como tales.
El primer bloque de análisis sectoriales es el de transportes y arranca con 
el	 trabajo	de	Jorge	García-Andrade.	Excelente	estudio,	por	 lo	demás,	que	se	
adentra, a través de la indagación sobre las tasas aeroportuarias, en la apo-
ría más desconcertante de este modo de transporte: ¿cómo puede hablarse de 
competencia en un ámbito de actividad sin precios, es decir, sin contrapresta-
ciones económicas por bienes y servicios establecidos mediante acuerdos vo-
luntarios? La aporía, como toda aporía, es irresoluble y, por eso mismo, sirve 
como herramienta de comprensión para poner de manifiesto, en este caso —y 
siempre según mi particular parecer—, que los tributos son un sustitutivo de 
los precios con una tremenda incidencia sobre los derechos de propiedad y, por 
tanto,	sobre	la	circulación	de	utilidades	entre	los	agentes	económicos.	Si,	como	
sucede en España, la prestación por el uso de los aeropuertos está sometida, en 
tanto que tributo, al principio de reserva de ley, ni los aeropuertos disponen de 
su capacidad, ni las compañías aéreas pueden elegir aeropuerto. Me resulta fá-
cil	hacer	propia	la	respuesta	de	García-Andrade:	el	sometimiento	del	uso	de	los	
aeropuertos al pago de tasas es un instrumento de redistribución en un doble 
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sentido, en el propio de todo tributo y en el de la configuración de la propiedad 
sobre los aeropuertos, a modo de red que pretende dar cohesión territorial al 
Estado. Como es bien sabido, la vigencia de este factor de cohesión está muy 
puesta en entredicho.
Con su habitual acierto e intensidad, Manuel Estepa nos ofrece a conti-
nuación el análisis de uno de los conflictos más arraigados —y también más 
ilustrativos— en la cultura de gestión pública española, el conflicto de com-
petencias entre los municipios y los puertos. La toma de referencia de un caso 
concreto y bien conocido no hace sino incrementar la capacidad explicativa 
del enfoque y proporcionarnos una excelente visión del territorio como soporte 
fundamental	de	la	legitimación	de	la	actuación	administrativa.	Si	se	me	per-
mite apuntar mi opinión, tal dialéctica no es otra que la existente entre el valor 
de los usos portuarios y el de los usos urbanísticos de los espacios, a la que 
no	puede	sustraerse,	en	ningún	caso,	 la	acción	colectiva.	Sin	la	más	mínima	
intención de desincentivar al lector a que saque sus propias conclusiones, me 
permito apuntar que uno de los síndromes más preocupantes y generalizados 
en nuestros gestores públicos es la hemiplejía del oferente, que consiste en el 
convencimiento de saber siempre lo quetodo el mundo debe querer para sí 
mismo y, por tanto, qué debe ser considerado valioso y con qué prelación. La 
gente vota con la cartera y, cuando sus decisiones económicas tienen asiento 
territorial, también con los pies y quien olvide esto, sobre todo si tiene una 
misión de gestión pública, comete el peor de los errores.
Remedios Zamora trata en su ensayo algunos problemas cruciales del 
transporte marítimo, concretamente los relacionados con la seguridad de los 
buques, materia en la que la autora se ha convertido en una consumada espe-
cialista, como bien demuestra su línea de trabajos precedentes y este mismo 
estudio.	Se	me	antoja	muy	destacable	el	tratamiento	interdisciplinar	y	de	Dere-
cho comparado que nos ofrece, que no se limita a satisfacer una exigencia del 
objeto de análisis y, por tanto, a cumplimentar una serie de referencias obliga-
das, sino que se convierte en la estructura metodológica básica de indagación. 
Me tomaré una vez más la licencia de dejar caer un comentario personal sobre 
este trabajo tan sugerente para decir que los Estados de bandera de los buques 
tienden a comportarse como polizones del tráfico marítimo: cobran impuestos 
a los armadores por prestarles su cobertura soberana —y participan así de los 
beneficios de la actividad de transporte—, pero se desentienden por completo 
de la engorrosa tarea de supervisar su estado y, en definitiva, de controlar o 
minimizar el riesgo que el propio buque provoca en el tráfico marítimo inter-
nacional; esto último se deja a las autoridades titulares de los puertos y a los 
13
Estados de paso, es decir, justamente a quienes pueden padecer los desastres 
provocados por la materialización de los riesgos de la navegación marítima. La 
técnica de los Memorándums, como acuerdos internacionales multilaterales, 
responde a esa necesidad de limitar el alcance de las externalidades en este 
sector del transporte.
Tal	vez	sean	los	servicios	postales,	de	los	que	se	ocupa	Javier	Guillén	Ca-
rames en su aportación, uno de los mejores ejemplos de aplicación de la noción 
de	SIEG	y	de	los	que,	probablemente	por	eso,	cuente	con	un	marco	normativo	
más fácilmente reconocible. Esta circunstancia es muy bien aprovechada por 
el	autor	para	hacer	un	acertado	análisis	de	la	evolución	de	los	SIEG	mediante	
el estudio de los principales pronunciamientos jurisprudenciales europeos y 
sus secuelas legislativas, con consideraciones muy clarificadoras sobre com-
pensaciones por obligaciones de servicio público. En claro beneficio de los 
resultados	de	su	estudio,	Guillén	está	atento	a	los	mecanismos	para	la	satisfac-
ción de dichas compensaciones y justamente aquí, según entiendo, asoma de 
nuevo la misión redistribuidora de la regulación y de las excepciones al juego 
de la competencia en los mercados. Es posible que las nuevas tecnologías y su 
progresiva universalización hayan reducido el sector postal a lo residual, pero 
el entendimiento de su textura resulta indispensable para entender en profundi-
dad los nuevos de modos de comunicación, relación y difusión que han venido 
a reemplazarlo.
Andrés	Boix	Palop	 forma	 parte	 del	 grupo	 de	 iuspublicistas	 académicos	
que dominan el audiovisual, es decir, que conocen profundamente no sólo su 
régimen jurídico, sino las entrañas mismas de la industria, de los procesos 
productivos, incluidos sus fundamentos técnicos, como es obvio. ¿Hay acaso 
otra	forma	de	transmitir	y	generar	verdadero	conocimiento?	Su	ensayo	es,	a	mi	
modo de ver, un trabajo brillante, constructivamente crítico, completo en su 
condensada brevedad, que da cuenta cabal del actual panorama del audiovisual 
español	y	deja	bien	 trazadas	sus	 líneas	de	desarrollo.	Si	no	me	equivoco,	 la	
argumentación del autor nos descubre que, en el audiovisual, la basculación 
entre regulación y competencia define el terreno de juego de la libertad de 
expresión y del pluralismo informativo, al tiempo que deja patentes las obse-
siones paranoicas del poder político —el único poder que existe— en un con-
texto tecnológico cada vez más abierto. Algunos podrán, incluso, considerar 
sorprendente que la libertad económica, la competencia propia del mercado, 
coincida con la libertad ideológica; la sorpresa desaparece con la constatación 
de una experiencia universal: la redistribución —impositiva o regulatoria— 
conlleva inevitablemente, tanto para los que dan como para los que reciben, 
14
mermas de libertad.
El	 estudio	 de	Natalia	García	Villena	 sirve	 de	 cierre	 a	 la	 serie	 de	 análi-
sis sectoriales y a este volumen colectivo. Casi a modo de última palabra, en 
absoluto otorgada intencionalmente —al menos por quien ahora se dirige a 
ustedes—, la autora aborda sin paliativos el meollo de los servicios públicos, 
la redistribución mediante regulación. Pero, además de este rasgo clave de 
los	SIEG,	el	caso	del	agua	le	sirve	a	García	Villena	para	desvelar	la	secuencia	
histórica, para nada pacífica, entre instituciones y organizaciones de acción co-
lectiva no burocráticas —no administrativas, si se quiere— y las burocráticas, 
o sea, las que, por desgracia, están generalizadas hoy día en España. En esa 
esperpéntica singladura nos señala la autora diferentes puntos de intermedios, 
como la obcecada distorsión de las divisiones territoriales naturales —provo-
cada por quienes se autoproclaman paladines del medio ambiente— y el esta-
blecimiento de exacciones para la financiación anticipada de obras que nunca 
se ha construido y tal vez nunca se vayan a construir, aunque las exacciones 
sí se hayan pagado. Por cierto que, respecto de esto último, también se da lo 
contrario, como la autora explica: obras que se hacen pero que no se pagan 
porque las exacciones no se cobran. La política hidráulica española, estatal y 
autonómica, no cesa de cosechar grandes éxitos, como vemos.
Tengo la impresión de haberme extendido demasiado y pido disculpas por 
los excesos provocados por lo mucho que me ha sugerido la lectura de los 
trabajos que se incluyen en esta obra. Agradezco profundamente a quienes han 
participado en ella su decidido interés, su paciencia conmigo y sus esfuerzos 
por el trabajo de calidad. No me cabe duda de que se han desempeñado con 
solvencia, la propia de quien da lustre de novedad a realidades no sólo viejas, 
sino	muy	viejas,	que	eso	son	los	SIEG.
Málaga,	julio	2014
Estudio introductorio
17
Discretion and Authority
in the Regulatory Context
D. J. Galligan
Professor	of	Socio-Legal	Studies,	Oxford	University
To public lawyers discretion is a core concept yet it causes them concern; to 
regulators discretion is similarly central to their everyday business but is not 
taken	for	granted	and	not	really	thought	about.	So,	why	do	lawyers	worry	about	
discretion, and why do regulators consider it essential to their world, a concept 
they	could	not	imagine	being	without?	I	shall	not	pretend	to	solve	the	problem	
in	this	short	essay,	but	my	purpose	is	to	offer	a	few	remarks	that	might	encour-
age	lawyers	to	worry	less	and	regulators	to	be	more	aware.	If	a	subtitle	were	to	
be added, it would be: socializing discretion and constitutionalizing discretion. 
By	this	I	mean,	first,	placing	discretion	in	a	social	as	opposed	to	purely	legal	
context; and, secondly, considering the constitutional implications of discre-
tion, rather than confining the analysis, as is normally the case, to a narrow 
notion of the rule of law. 
The regulation of social and economic activities by law is a feature of any 
society, ancient or modern, but it does seem more extensive and pervasive than 
ever before. Whether there is a distinct concept of regulation, considering the 
various ways laws of different types regulate or try to regulate behavior, is 
arguable.	Without	entering	that	debate,	I	propose	to	focus	on	a	narrow,	central	
sense of regulation: the placing of legal restrictions on activitiesthat are them-
selves lawful or legitimate, where the point of the restrictions is to control or 
limit them in some way, but not to prohibit them. The justification is that regu-
lation is based on goals and values important enough in the society to warrant 
the restrictions. Manufacturing is a valuable activity, socially and economi-
cally, but should not cause undue pollution. Creating employment is a social 
good,	but	it	should	be	conducted	in	such	a	way	that	workers	are	treated	fairly,	
and with care for their safety. Where regulatory standards come from, whose 
interests and values they serve, and whether they succeed in their purposes, are 
all	interesting	issues	about	which	it	would	be	good	to	know	more,	but	not	ones	
I	shall	consider	here.	Presenting	regulation	in	this	way	highlights	the	tension	
18
inherent in it, the tension between two competing social goods: the social value 
in the regulated activity, and the social value on which the regulatory standards 
are based. Through regulation a society attempts to reach an accommodation 
of the two.
The significance of the tension becomes clear when we introduce the legal 
regime	 through	which	 the	 regulatory	 standards	 are	 expressed.	 Since	 regula-
tion restricts legitimate social and economic activities, importing public stand-
ards into essentially private activities, the restrictions, arguably, should not 
interfere, in a liberal society, more than is necessary to achieve the underly-
ing social goods. This places a limit not just on the content of the regulatory 
standards,	but	on	the	form	they	take.	Here	we	encounter	the	rule	of	law	and	
the idea that the rule of law imposes restrains on how, the manner by which, 
the	state	controls	private	activities.	The	form	regulation	regimes	take,	not	just	
the	content,	matters.	 In	 their	views	of	 the	 rule	of	 law,	English	 lawyers	have	
long-laboured	 in	 the	shadow	of	A.V.	Dicey,	 the	19th century jurist, who was 
influential in shaping our understanding of the constitution of the United King-
dom.	According	to	Dicey,	the	rule	of	law	means	that:	(i)	action	may	be	taken	
against a person only for a distinct breach of law, established in the ordinary 
legal manner before the ordinary courts; and (ii) the ordinary law applies to all, 
and no one is exempt, including officials. Dicey’s emphasis fell on the first, for 
he went on to say that the rule of law is to be contrasted “with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, 
or	discretionary	powers	of	constraint”	(Dicey	1961,	Dicey	1901).	He	did	not	
quite say that discretionary power is by nature contrary to the rule of law, but 
he	came	close.	Despite	having	provoked	controversy	over	the	years,	Dicey’s	
view	of	the	rule	of	law	seems	to	invoke	a	fundamental	and	compelling	idea.	
His claim has both sociological and normative dimensions.
As a sociological claim, Dicey’s conception of law as fixed, general stand-
ards	governing	an	area	of	activity	invokes	a	long	tradition	of	both	analytical	
and sociological jurisprudence. This is the idea of law H.L.A. Hart settled on 
and developed in the concept of law and which he claimed was the basis for 
‘a	descriptive	 sociology	of	 law’	 (Hart	1961).	As	a	normative claim, Dicey’s 
conception of the rule of law emphasizes settled standards as a way of defin-
ing	and	protecting	the	liberty	of	the	subject.	F.A.	Hayek,	the	economist	who	
also	wrote	on	constitutions,	took	the	idea	of	government	by	rules	to	mean	that	
all aspects of the relationship between citizen and state ought to be governed 
by	clear	and	detailed	rules,	which	preclude	discretion	(Hayek,	1960,	compare	
Galligan	1984).	This	is	an	extreme	position;	it	places	a	strict	interpretation	on	
19
the normative notion of government through rules; it is sociologically naïve 
since such a notion is impossible to achieve in practice and bears little relation 
to	how	power	is	exercised	by	officials.	But	in	a	sense	Hayek’s	position	has	a	
logic, for once the rule of law is defined in terms of clear and general rules, 
there is no room for discretion, since discretion on this view is defined as the 
opposite	of	rules.	If	government	through	rules	becomes	the	overriding	norma-
tive	principle,	then	discretion	is	necessarily	ruled-out.
I	propose	 to	 reconsider	 the	notion	of	discretion,	 to	offer	a	 revival	of	an	
old	interpretation,	long	since	forgotten	and	neglected,	but	I	think	of	well	worth	
the efforts of recovery. Let us begin by noting the ambiguity of the notion, 
an	ambiguity	I	wish	to	exploit.	Etymologically,	discretion	refers	to	judgment,	
suggesting good or sound judgment, my preference being for the more neutral 
sound judgment. Discretion is a quality enabling sound judgment and hence 
good	government.	In	its	modern	usage,	however,	discretion	has	come	to	mean	
autonomy in judgment, that is, to have discretion is to have a zone of autonomy 
relatively	free	from	reason-guiding	and	conclusory	rules.	The	emphasis	is	on	
the	freedom	to	make	a	judgment,	freedom	from	rules,	rather	than	the	quality	of	
the judgment. We shall see the significance of the distinction shortly.
In	 its	central	modern	sense,	discretion	as	 it	occurs	 in	 law	suggests	 that,	
in deciding whether or not to do action a, or how to do action A, the official 
has some significant freedom of choice as to the criteria to apply; he is not 
simply applying a set standard, but instead has scope to choose the standard. 
Discretion means that in deciding the best course of action, the official settles 
the standards, determines the facts, and applies the standards to the facts. Dis-
cretion is neither licence nor freedom to decide in the absence of standards; it 
is to act according to standards where the standards are in the main left to the 
decision-maker.	This	is	in	the	nature	of	an	ideal	type,	in	Max	Weber’s	sense,	
for in practice the distinction between having authoritative standards to apply, 
and	having	to	create	one’s	own,	is	not	so	clear	cut	(Weber	1978).	It	is	rare	to	
find that no authoritative standards are provided; where there are authoritative 
standards, they may allow substantial discretion in deciding what they mean 
and how to apply them, and even the tightest standards have to be interpreted. 
A	full	socio-legal	account	would	extend	beyond	the	central	model	to	find	dis-
cretion open to wider meanings and occurring in other places; it would include 
informal	and	unauthorized	senses	of	discretion,	discretion	in	fact-finding	and	
in evaluating and interpreting evidence and facts.1	But	for	present	purposes,	let	
1	 Discussed	in	Galligan	1986,	Chapter	1.
20
us stay with the ideal type or central case of discretion. That ideal type, or cen-
tral	case,	I	take	to	be:	discretion	as	a	context	of	decision	and	action,	where	the	
legal	framework	leaves	to	regulators	an	arena	within	which	they	must	exercise	
judgement, in the relative absence of clear and biding directions from the law.
The briefest survey of regulatory regimes shows just how often powers 
of	a	discretionary	kind	are	conferred	on	officials.	This	is	brought	out	by	first	
considering a brief analysis of the structure of a regulatory regime, where four 
kinds	of	decisions	occur.	(i)	Decisions	of	general	policy,	where	the	object	is	
to formulate standards, often very general in nature, as to how in practice the 
regulatory objectives are to be achieved. This often goes under the name of 
rule-making, by which is meant the formulation of standards. This sometimes 
takes	the	form	of	delegated	or	secondary	legislation,	or	it	might	be	an	informal	
process resulting in informal standards. (ii) A decision can be one of specific 
policy, where the object is to settle a matter of interest to the public or a sector 
of the public: whether to build a motorway, where to site a shopping centre, 
whether	 to	 close	 a	 local	 school.	Thedecision-is	 one	 off	 and	 is	 not	 directed	
at	 setting	general	 standards	 for	 the	 future.	 (iii)	The	 third	kind	of	decision	 is	
deciding a particular case, an individualized decision, where the interests of 
one	or	a	few	are	at	stake:	whether	to	be	granted	a	benefit,	a	licence	to	conduct	
a	business,	or	a	place	 in	a	 school.	We	might	 think	of	 this	as	modified adju-
dication, suggesting that a decision has to be made about a particular case 
and therefore has an adjudicative aspect, but at the same time it may be more 
or less governed by settled standards, more or less discretionary. (iv) A final 
category to mention is routine administration, where rules are applied in an al-
most	mechanical	way,	suggesting	the	paradigm	case	of	bureaucratic	decision-
making	as	depicted	by	Weber:	have	you	renewed	your	car	tax,	submitted	your	
tax	return	by	a	given	date.	Each	mode	of	decision-making	can	be	matched	to	a	
set of procedures: policy decisions naturally emphasize consultation with in-
terested parties, while those affecting an individual person or group are closer 
to	the	model	of	the	trial	–	to	know	the	facts	and	the	standards,	and	to	have	an	
opportunity	to	make	one’s	case.	While	each	of	these	modes	of	administration	
and regulation raise interesting questions about administrative government and 
administrative justice, my emphasis will be on the encounter between the indi-
vidual person, whether a real person or a corporate one, rather than the plainly 
policy cases. My reason for placing the emphasis in this way is simply that the 
encounter between the regulatory body and the citizen raises basic questions 
about the nature of regulatory authority and the constitutional constraints on it.
Let us now consider the reasons why discretion seems to have a central 
21
place	 in	regulatory	regimes.	That	 it	has	such	a	central	place	I	am	taking	for	
granted	in	the	following	analysis	since	we	lack	a	full	empirical	survey	of	dis-
cretion in regulation. Allowing that assumption, if we consider regulatory re-
gimes	from	a	socio-legal	perspective,	several	reasons	for	reliance	on	discre-
tion appear. The main reason, and the reason around which others cluster, is 
that discretion serves as an instrument for achieving the goals of regulation. 
Remember the sense of discretion as good or sound judgment, the idea being 
that the relative freedom discretion allows to the official has utility in enabling 
a sound judgement to be made as to how best to achieve in the particular case 
the purposes for which the system has been created. The more accurately those 
purposes are achieved in particular cases, the more effective the system of reg-
ulation.	This	helps	us	to	see	the	drawback	of	rules:	in	both	under-including	and	
over-including	they	impede	regulatory	effectiveness.	Why	they	do	so	relates	
to	 another	 factor:	 the	 kinds	 of	 activities	 being	 regulated	 are	 often	 complex,	
and	 I	mention	 in	passing	Niklas	Luhmann’s	 account	of	 complexity	 in	mod-
ern	societies	(Luhmann,	1969).	Regulation	covers	a	wide	range	of	social	and	
economic	 issues	which	often	require	expert	or	specialized	knowledge	of	 the	
kind	that	cannot	be	rendered	without	loss	into	a	set	of	detailed	rules.	Mention	
should also be made of resources: discretion allows the strategic use of limited 
resources. Rules can of course be created and imposed on discretionary con-
texts,	and	such	practices	are	common	enough.	But	the	consequences	have	to	be	
considered. The rules may not fit the purpose and may not be capable of doing 
so, and so there is a loss in regulatory effectiveness. Rules imposed at one point 
may create discretion at another; and rules themselves tend to create discretion, 
not just in interpretation, but discretion whether or not to apply the rules, or to 
modify	their	application	or	to	partly	apply	them,	all	of	which	are	well-known	
occurrences. Here we begin to see the core of a dilemma that has to be faced: 
judged from the standpoint of effectiveness, discretion finds a natural home in 
the	context	of	regulation.	It	appears	to	be	a	valuable	tool	in	the	effectiveness	
and	success	of	regulation.	In	the	wider	context	of	coordination,	regulation	is	
a device for coordinating society, politics, and economics, and regulation is 
likely	to	be	optimal	when	rich	in	discretion.
Now	we	must	consider	what	it	is	about	discretion	that	makes	it	problem-
atical in a modern legal order; if you prefer the language of legitimacy, what is 
it	about	discretion	that	undermines	the	legitimacy	of	the	legal	order.	In	coordi-
nation terms, despite the place of discretion in contributing positively to regu-
latory coordination, does it have negative elements that detract from its utility 
in coordination? Coordination depends on two elements: capable government, 
which here translates as effective regulatory regimes, and popular acquies-
22
cence, which means that those involved or affected at least tacitly accept the 
system as a basis for coordination. These concerns suggest the need to consider 
further two issues: one is a fuller understanding of the nature of discretion as 
an instrument to effective regulation; the other is a better understanding of the 
place	of	discretionary	powers	in	a	constitutional	order	of	the	kind	now	com-
mon across Europe, an order based on liberty, democracy, respect for persons, 
and	the	rule	of	law?	So	far	we	have	two	rather	blunt	and	undifferentiated	con-
cepts which are in opposition: one is a narrow view of the rule of law as rules, 
the other an undeveloped notion of discretion as sound judgment. We need to 
investigate both more fully.
In	order	to	develop	the	notion	of	discretion,	and	prompted	by	the	question	
what	constitutes	a	sound	judgment,	we	should	analyse	the	context	of	decision-
making.	First,	to	think	of	discretion	as	simply	the	subjective	judgement	of	an	
official	is	artificial	and	a-contextual.	On	the	contrary,	as	vehicles	for	practical	
judgments, discretionary decisions are made in a social context of conventions, 
understandings, and normative standards about what constitutes a sound and 
rational	decision	concerning	a	matter.	Any	decision-making	context	is	already	
thick	with	understandings	about	how	to	decide	and	what	constitutes	an	accept-
able decision. We might refer to this as a social arena or social sphere, by which 
I	mean	a	context	structured	and	constrained	both	cognitively	and	normatively.2 
Secondly,	we	need	to	collapse	the	unfortunate	opposition	posed	between	sound	
judgment	and	rules.	The	Cambridge	philosopher,	Peter	Winch,	wrote	a	book	in	
the	1960’s	which	received	a	lot	of	attention	(Winch,	1960).	In	searching	for	a	
philosophical understanding of social science, Winch drew on anthropological 
studies	to	establish	the	position	that	all	meaningful	human	activity	is	rule-gov-
erned. The legal philosopher, H.L.A. Hart, incidentally, whose the concept of 
law was	published	shortly	after,	was	much	influenced	by	Winch’s	book.	We	
need not try to assess the empirical validity of Winch’s claim, but it is surely 
true in general, and especially in the public sphere.
Douglas North, the economist, has demonstrated the importance of rules in 
rational	decision-making	(North,	1990).	Rules,	which	may	be	formal	or	infor-
mal,	official	or	unofficial,	contribute	in	several	ways	to	rational	decision-mak-
ing,	or	in	our	terminology,	to	sound	judgement.	They	help	the	decision-maker	
deal	with	over-complex	situations;	they	compensate	for	incomplete	knowledge	
on	the	part	of	the	decision-maker;	and	they	are	efficient	in	reducing	the	time	
needed to form a judgement – one avoids having to reconsider or reinvent what 
2	 For	the	concept	of	a	social	sphere	and	its	point,	see:	Galligan	2007.
23
constitutes sound reasons each time a decision is made. Rules, or institutions 
as North tends to call sets of rules, ‘reduce uncertainty by establishing a stablestructure to human interaction’. Rules are, indeed, of fundamental importance 
in	 ‘shaping	 human	 interaction’	 (North	 1990:5).	 They	 serve	 this	 purpose	 by	
placing constraints on and guiding human interaction, interaction between the 
regulatory official and the regulatee. Thirdly, empirical studies of discretionary 
action show quite plainly that discretionary arenas soon develop, partly by ex-
perience of the matters in issue, and partly by importing cognitive and norma-
tive understandings from a common pool of experience. They soon develop a 
structure	and	network	of	conventions,	standards,	and	understandings	as	to	how	
to	judge	in	that	context,	and	what	constitutes	good	judgment.	It	is	in	the	nature	
of	reasoned	decision-making	that	we	seek	out	what	are	good	and	sound	reasons	
in that context. We now see emerging a more complete notion of discretion as 
good or sound judgement, which is far from a simple notion of raw or subjec-
tive	judgment.	It	is	judgement	within	an	arena	of	constraints	and	guidelines	as	
to what constitutes rational, reasonable, and acceptable judgement.
Just as more sense can be made of discretion by placing it in context, the 
same	applies	 to	 the	constitutional	constraints	on	discretion.	It	 is	easy	 to	slip	
into	a	relentless	logic	by	which	the	rule	of	law	becomes	the	rule	of	rules.	Hayek	
is not the only one to have done so. K. C. Davis was an influential professor of 
administrative	law	at	Chicago	Law	School,	who	in	the	1960-70’s	carried-out	
pioneering	work	on	administrative	discretion	and	its	control,	who	really	was	
the	first	in	the	Anglo-American	world	to	recognize	the	full	import	of	discre-
tion	and	 the	 threat	 it	posed	of	arbitrariness	and	unfairness	 (Davis,	1969).	 In	
searching	for	ways	to	contain	discretion,	Davis’	work	could	be	interpreted	as	
relying too heavily on the utility of rules, by ‘structuring’, a favourite term of 
his, discretion through rules. To structure discretion is to bring it under control 
through rules, as if to say the more rules the better. Davis is more subtle than 
that, but the heavy reliance on rules cannot be denied. The first step towards 
deepening the analysis, and in the process better understanding not just the 
constitutional implications of the rule of law but the rule of law itself, can be 
found	in	L.	L.	Fuller’s	writings,	where	he	tries	to	identify	an	‘inner	morality	
of	law’	(Fuller,	1964).	This	centres	on	law	being	a	guide	to	behaviour	and	ex-
plains how in practice that purpose can be achieved. His practical principles 
are	fairly	mundane	and	rather	obvious	–	publication,	non-retrospective,	non-
contradictory, generalizable, and understandable – but they have the effect of 
limiting the utility of rules, limits which are inherent in the nature of rules as 
guides	to	behaviour.	If	 the	objective	of	rules	is	to	guide	behaviour,	rules	are	
effective in attaining that objective only if they have such general features, 
24
which means rules are limited in their role in discretion, for often the circum-
stances are such that the inner morality of rules cannot be satisfied. To govern 
through rules in such circumstances will create a pathology of rules and inef-
fective	regulation.	A	strictly	rule-based	account	of	the	rule	of	law	is,	therefore,	
necessarily inadequate as a means of constitutionalizing discretion.
This conclusion means that we must return to the constitutional bazaar 
to see what is on offer, what other ideas, concepts, and values are available 
that might be of use in constitutionalizing discretion. On further reflection, the 
concept of coordination gives some guidance. Law is a coordinating device, 
which means it has the capacity to organize social, economic, and political 
life towards the efficient achievement of goals.3	 If	 regulatory	regimes	are	 to	
be effective in coordinating complex activities, they must be acceptable to the 
parties. Acquiescence rather than acceptance is the more common notion, but 
my suggestion would be that in the constitutional orders of European nations, 
and other nations sharing a similar constitutional culture, bare acquiescence, or 
tacit acceptance, is replaced by a norm of acceptance, suggesting congruence 
not	just	with	coordination	but	with	a	particular	kind	of	coordination.	That	is	the	
difference between a liberal democratic order and those of a more autocratic 
character. Acceptance seems to have three elements: who regulates; the expec-
tations held of the regulators; and the monitoring and scrutiny of regulators.
As to who regulates, parallels may be drawn with representatives appoint-
ed	by	election.	It	would	be	fanciful	to	think	of	electing	regulators	–	or	perhaps	
not	so	fanciful	–	but	it	is	not	the	practice.	In	the	absence	of	the	representative	
-elector	relationship,	the	question	‘who	regulates’	is	answered	on	the	basis	of	
ability, experience, expertise, and the capacity for sound judgement. Regula-
tion	 as	 an	 act	 of	 governing	 can	 properly	 be	 carried-out	 by	 those	who	 have	
the capacity for sound judgement in that context. Just as the expectations the 
people as a whole hold of government, are an essential element of democratic 
constitutional	orders,	so	they	might	ask,	and	in	asking	join	forces	with	those	
directly affected by regulation: what is legitimately expected of regulators? 
The answer is not straightforward, both constitutionally and empirically, and 
awaits	further	research.	But	we	might	propose	a	few	tentative	answers.	On	ex-
pectation is that regulators in using their discretion exercise sound judgement 
in the sense suggested above, that is to say, they construct through consulta-
tion, experience, and deliberation a social arena which meets the conditions of 
rational reasonableness and common fairness. A second expectation is that the 
3	 See	further:	Finnis:	1980	and	Hardin:	1999.
25
actual	exercise	of	regulatory	discretion	will	be	taken	within	that	arena,	and	that	
how it does will be explained and justified. A third expectation would relate to 
the procedures and processes by which the judgement is reached. Procedures 
are	after	all	instruments	for	achieving	sound	outcomes,	as	Bentham	liked	to	say	
means to rectitude, while at the same time respecting other common values.
Monitoring and scrutiny of government is the third element in constitution-
alizing discretion. Just as the monitoring and scrutiny of government general 
is	now	coming	to	be	regarded	as	a	key	feature	of	constitutional	government,	
the	same	idea	applies	in	regulatory	contexts.	Here	I	mean	more	than	the	for-
mal lines of accountability, which are an important part but not enough and by 
no	means	the	whole.	Informal	mechanisms	based	on	information,	knowledge,	
transparency, answerability, should all be included. The media is emerging as 
a major medium of scrutiny, and within the media special attention should be 
paid to the social media. There is now no hiding by government, no place of 
safety,	from	the	media	in	its	several	forms.	As	unlikely	as	it	may	sound,	the	
media has become a potent instrument in constitutionalizing government, in 
rendering	it	open	to	‘the	gaze	of	the	people’	(Green:	2010).	The	social	media	
now leads that crusade and the ideas apply equally to regulation. This is merely 
to raise the issue rather than to offer any clear direction, but the approach and 
its potential are plain.
I	 conclude	 by	 returning	 to	 the	 nation	 of	 discretion	 as	 good	 and	 sound	
judgement, rather that autonomy, or to be more accurate autonomy is neces-
sary to allow scope for, to facilitate, sound judgement. We now see how useful 
that older notion of discretion might be, both in better understanding discre-
tion	 in	 its	social	setting,	and	 in	bringing	discretion	within	 the	 framework	of	
constitutionalism.
Citations
DAVIS,	K.	C., discretioanry Justice (Louisiana,	1969).
DICEy,	A.	V.,the law of theconstitution (London,	1961).
 “droit administratif in	Modern	 French	Law”	 (1901)	 17	law Quarterly 
Review 302.
	 “The	 Development	 of	Administrative	 Law	 in	 England”	 (1915)	 31	law 
Quarterly Review 148.
FINNIS,	J.,	natural law and natural Rights (Clarendon,	Oxford,	1980).
FULLER,	L.	L., the morality of law (yale	University	Press,	1964).
26
GALLIGAN,	D.	J.,	“Arbitrariness	and	Formal	Justice	in	Discretionary	Deci-
sions” in essays in legal theory (Melbourne University Press, Melbour-
ne,	19840.
 Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion Clarendon,, 
Oxford,	1986).
 law in modern Society Oxford	University	Press,	2007).
GREEN,	J.	E., the eyes of the people (Oxford	University	Press,	2010).
HARDIN,	R. liberalsim, constitutionalism, and democracy (Oxford Univer-
sity	Press,	1999).
HART, H. L. A., the concept of law (Clarendon,	Oxford,	1961).
HAyEK,	F	VON, the constitution of liberty (London,	1960).
LUHMANN, N., trust and power (London,	1969).
	 (1977)	11	canadian Journal of Sociology 29.
NORTH, D. C., institutions, institutional change and economic performance 
(Cambridge	University	Press,	1990).
WEBER,	M., economy and Society (ed)	G.	Roth	and	C.	Wittick	 (California	
University	Press,	1978).
WINCH,	 P., the idea of the Social Science and its Relation to philosophy 
(Routledge,	London,	1958,	2nd	edition	1990).
Aspectos generales y organizativos
29
An Entrepreneurial approach to the role of 
Competition agency: a case study for Peru
Rubén C. B. Méndez Reátegui
Raúl E. Alosilla Díaz
I. Introduction
In	the	context	of	Peruvian	economic	and	legal	reforms	during	the	90’s,	a	
new economic system was set up on the grounds of a restored political signifi-
cance of property rights and economic freedom. Within this system, Antitrust 
was	assumed	to	be	an	appropriate	part	of	market	power	regulation.	According	
to the mainstream economic and legal approach, Antitrust agencies such as 
INDECOPI1 should not intervene aiming at specific results, but are constrained 
to	fulfill	 the	role	of	an	impartial	and	technical	arbitrator	 in	the	market	(Bul-
lard,	 2006);	 that	 is,	 to	 safeguard	 certain	 conditions	 for	 the	 development	 of	
a	competitive	process.	 In	 line	with	neoclassical	 theory	of	monopoly,	private	
firms	exercising	market	power	would	eventually	create	restrictions	and	inef-
ficiencies (i.e. through certain pricing strategies, discrimination, unjustified 
refusals to deal, concentration, etc.) that prevent or lessen competition and 
generates	social	deadweight	efficiency	losses.	It	was	argued	that	a	proper	goal	
for the Peruvian Antitrust system was to merely correct these restrictions and 
inefficiencies	on	a	case-by-case	and	cost-and-benefit	kind	of	intervention.	In	
this context, competition agency would have to replicate the efficient results 
markets	 would	 have	 reached	 at	 in	 the	 absence	 of	market	 power	 distortions	
(Gómez	and	Zúñiga,	2005).
More	 specifically,	 competition	 agency	 should:	 (i)	 Impartially	delimitate	
the	market	segment	to	be	analyzed,	(ii)	evaluate	the	social	costs	and	benefits	
generated by the alleged anticompetitive conduct under investigation, and (iii) 
enact	remedial	mandates	to	restore	market	efficiency.	This	efficiency-correc-
tive	approach	excludes	other	 so-called	populist	objectives	 from	 the	antitrust	
1	 INDECOPI	is	the	“Instituto	Nacional	de	Defensa	de	la	Competencia	y	de	la	Protección	de	la	Propiedad	
Intellectual”.	It	is	the	Peruvian	Competition	agency	along	with	OSIPTEL	(Organismo	Supervisor	de	la	
Inversión	Privada	en	Telecomunicaciones)	regarding	telecom	Competition	issues.
30
system such as the design of specific political results, redistribution of wealth 
or	protection	for	small	firms	(Cáceres,	2006).
This paper presents a conceptual model to show how the pretense of im-
partiality, objectivity and technicality, i.e. the exercise of an alleged corrective 
intervention from governmental agencies, is incompatible with the creative 
and	dynamic	nature	of	the	competitive	process,	as	defined	by	Hayek	(1968).	
On the contrary, following the entrepreneurial approach introduced by Knight 
(1964)	and	Kirzner	(1973),	we	argue	that	in	the	absence	of	perfect	knowledge	
about resource allocation, the Competition agency cannot help but behaving as 
another entrepreneur	in	the	market,	demonstrating	in	each	of	its	decisions	a	set	
of judgments of relevance, value judgments, preferences, subjective expecta-
tions,	etc.	From	this	approach,	their	decisions	consist	of	entrepreneurial	bets	
with	contingent	economic	outcomes	and	subject	to	the	trial-and-error	market	
mechanism.
The first chapter explores competition as a social dynamic and discovery 
process	and	entrepreneurship	as	a	key	concept	for	our	critical	model.	On	the	
basis	of	this	framework,	the	second	chapter	discusses	the	alleged	merely	cor-
rective role of the Peruvian Antitrust agency. The third chapter illustrates how 
relevant	markets	cannot	be	delimitated	without	a	bunch	of	entrepreneurial	dis-
cretional	judgments.	Finally	conclusions	are	submitted.
II. Competition as a “Social Process” and the “Entrepreneur’s 
Role”
Under	a	causal-realist	perspective,	all	economic	agents	only	have	imper-
fect	information	and	are	forced	to	use	a	fraction	of	the	available	knowledge	in	
order to adjust their behavior creatively in accordance to their objectives. As 
a result of its interactive and iterative realization2, individual adjustments lead 
to the emergence of a set of institutions that deal with uncertainty and transac-
tion costs (e.g. currency, exchange rates, types of contractual arrangements, 
etc.); and therefore enables the development and expansion of the production 
and	marketing	of	all	types	of	goods.	In	this	context,	economic	competition	is	a	
social phenomenon driven by alert entrepreneurs who —using contractual in-
stitutions— redeploy resources in order to create and gain pure economic ben-
2	 “Interactive”	stands	for	choices	by	which	individuals	engage	into	a	relationship	with	others.	For	ex-
ample,	we	may	refer	to	a	typical	economic	exchange	as	“interaction”.	On	the	other	hand,	“Iterative”	
refers to the fact that repeated interaction tend to form certain patterns of behavior that, if internalized 
and generalized in society, can become into institutions.
31
efits, excluding others from the same chance. These economic benefits are net 
gains	obtained	from	better	coordination	(O´Driscoll,	1977)	between	the	uses	of	
economic resources —which includes not only the mere use (productive use) 
but also the way they are exploited (technology) and governance rules for the 
use	of	resources	(inter-intra	organization)—	and	consumer	needs.	To	achieve	
improved coordination and benefits in the context of uncertainty, competitors 
must	use	their	own	entrepreneurial	judgment	(Knight,	1964).
Permanent reallocation of resources is a trial and error process itself: al-
though entrepreneurs may discover opportunities for better coordination and 
pure	profit	(Kirzner,	1973;	Mises,	2008),	 there	is	no	guarantee	that	 their	ex-
pectations	are	met.	The	latter	depend	on	concrete	decisions	consumers	make.	
Since	uncertainty	is	ineradicable	(because	contextual	microeconomic	variables	
are constantly changing), once a decision is implemented the entrepreneur may 
realize serious errors about resource allocation were committed (we may call 
this “poor judgment”), which subsequently can be perceived as new profit op-
portunities for himself (for if he attempts to correct his previous errors, then 
he is avoiding losses) or for other entrepreneurs (if they detect the error and 
decide	to	amend	it	by	newer	contractual	arrangements).	If	expectations	are	cor-
rect, then pure benefits or profits will be provided, while if they are not right 
and	 the	mistakes	 cannot	 be	 amended	 early,	 then	 the	 entrepreneurwill	 have	
invested resources in a project not as valuable or urgent for consumers. There-
fore,	he	assumes	losses.	This	mechanism	is	inexorable	(Mises,	2008).
So,	as	long	as	current	institutional	framework	allows	any	individual	entre-
preneur to use their judgment and adjust the use of resources for better coordi-
nation,	and	given	that	profit-and-loss	mechanism	rewards	good	judgments	and	
punishes poor judgment, then decentralized competitive process will tend to 
overcome	any	lack	of	coordination,	inefficiencies	or	errors.	Under	this	frame-
work,	the	idea	of	competition	as	a	discovery	process	stands	as	fully	justified	
(Hayek,	1968).
Unlike	 the perfect competition paradigm, the notion of economic com-
petition previously outlined is much more realistic	in	terms	of	(1)	the	cogni-
tive	 constraints	 of	 economic	 agents	 (no	 perfect	 knowledge	 is	 needed	 to	 be	
assumed),	(2)	the	dynamic	and	evolving	nature	of	the	competitive process (as 
opposed	to	an	equilibrium	kind	of	approach	to	competition	and	the	structure-
conduct-performance	paradigm),	(3)	 the	fundamental	role	of	 institutions	and	
their	relationship	to	entrepreneurship	in	market	clearance	(market	is	not	per-
fect; correcting patterns stem from entrepreneurial adjustments in the context 
of	effective	institutions);	(4)	stating	price competition	is	a	limited	(one-dimen-
32
sional)	indicator	of	competitive	markets	(better	coordination	can	be	related	to	
any	feature	involved	in	economic	transaction,	not	just	price),	(5)	recognizing	
analysis	may	go	wrong	if	isolated	“relevant”	markets	are	assumed	to	have	no	
competitive	relationship	or	effects	in	other	markets,	(6)	the	weight	attached	to	
net margins (price minus marginal cost) as an indicator of competition, and so 
on. 
This model also provides a fundamental role for the entrepreneur. After 
all, it is the entrepreneur who directs the course of production on the basis of 
his own particular (and fallible) judgments. Entrepreneurial judgment can be 
described	as	 “knowledge	of	 the	particular	 circumstances	of	 time	and	place”	
(Hayek,	1945),	“non-articulated	or	tacit	knowledge”	(Polanyi,	1974)	or	“prac-
tical	knowledge”	(Oakeshott,	1962).	Subjective	understanding	of	present	and	
future	conditions	underlies	his	decisions.	This	 first-hand	kind	of	knowledge	
implies his services cannot be assessed in terms of marginal product; rather he 
is the one who primarily estimates future prices and thus the discounted mar-
ginal	product	of	all	available	resources	(Foss	et.	al.,	2007).	That	is,	informed	
but	discretional	choice	defines	his	strategies	over	the	use	of	resources.	In	any	
case, entrepreneurial judgment stands as opposed to objective, technical or 
scientific	knowledge	(Huerta	de	Soto,	2005).	
There	is	a	growing	literature	that	takes	into	account	(i)	the	re-introduction	
of	entrepreneurship	into	mainstream	economic	theory	(Baumol,	2010),	(ii)	how	
institutional conditions favor productive, unproductive or destructive entrepre-
neurship	(Baumol,	1990;	Boettke,	2012),	(iii)	the	cognitive	characteristics	of	
entrepreneurial	discovery	and	creativity	(Buenstorf,	2006;	Kor,	Mahoney	and	
Michael,	2007)	as	well	as	(iv)	the	reasons	why	entrepreneurship	has	been	ig-
nored	largely	and	lately	(Foss,	1991;	Hodgson,	2011)	from	market	clearance	
process analysis. We stand on this research and apply it to the alleged role for 
the Competition agency within the Peruvian Antitrust system.
III. Antitrust Agencies and Entrepreneurial Knowledge
How	important	is	this	framework	regarding	the	activity	of	the	Competition	
agency? As previously stated, Peruvian Antitrust system is supposed to tech-
nically correct the effects of anticompetitive behavior without following any 
other purpose than efficiency. As mentioned before, its role has been compared 
to the role of a neutral arbitrator in a sports game, as opposed to the role of a 
player	(Bullard,	2006).
We will analyze whether the fulfillment of this role is possible on the basis 
33
of entrepreneurship theory. 
When correcting anticompetitive behavior, the Competition agency can 
not	only	punish	the	undertakings	by	imposing	fines,	but	it	also	has	the	power	
to issue corrective measures, namely:
1.	 The mandatory celebration of certain contracts, if an “unjustified re-
fusal to lease” is proven,
2.	 The adoption of certain contractual terms and conditions in favor of 
certain competitors, in a dispute over exclusionary discrimination,
3.	 The	 disintegration	 of	 packages	 of	 goods,	 whenever	 a	 protest	 states	
“tied sales” were proven,
4.	 The	 disintegration	 of	 vertical	 or	 horizontal	 integration	 of	 any	 kind,	
including corporate partnerships, joint ventures and exclusive agree-
ments, if an investigation states these agreements “restrict free com-
petition”,
5.	 In	the	electric	industry,	the	Competition	agency	can	ban	a	merger	or	
any	kind	of	integration	if	it	substantially	increases	the	concentration	
of	market	power.
The more generic remedy is to cease —as to modify— anticompetitive 
behavior.	Furthermore,	the	legal	system	provides	the	Competition	agency	with	
discretionary power to order different types precautionary measures to ensure 
the effectiveness of future remedial action.
We argue that the above decisions involve a deliberate modification of the 
production structure of existing contractual arrangements. This is relatively 
obvious. When ordering a producer to contract with two or more distributors 
rather than with an exclusive one, terms and conditions under which goods 
are offered are modified for all economic agents involved (insiders and out-
siders). The structure of contractual arrangements is also modified when the 
Competition agency establishes the coordination of production processes to be 
performed	intra-company	rather	than	inter-company	(when	the	agency	prefers	
property relationships over contractual relationships, or vice versa); moreover, 
this modification creates opportunity costs and benefits dispersedly imposed 
on multiple actors. When enacting a decision, the competition agency seeks 
to improve the efficiency of the structure of economic relations that market 
players —both upstream and downstream entrepreneurs and final consum-
ers— have spontaneously established up to a particular historical moment. 
Under the mainstream approach, the Competition agency decision corrects the 
current pattern of economic relations —that is the productive structure— for 
34
it is inefficient or uncoordinated	 “because	of	 the	undertaking	behavior”	and	
consequently,	it	seems	necessary	not	only	to	punish	the	undertaking	but	to	in-
tervene	this	structure	to	achieve	another	market	situation	of	greater	efficiency	
and coordination; that is, “to restore market efficiency” by issuing corrective 
measures.
Take,	 for	 example,	 the	 following	 cases:	 In	 Santa	Beatriz	 SRL	Deposits	
and	Others	vs.	Distributor	Norte	Pacasmayo	SRL	(Joined	Cases	No.	001-2001/
CLC	 and	 002-2001/CLC),	 the	 Competition	 agency	 ordered	 the	“immediate 
and definitive cessation of the conduct constituting abuse of dominant position 
on the market in the forms of discrimination and linked contracts”, and fined 
with	50	TIU’s3.	In	this	case,	the	agency	dismantled	the	particular	structure	of	
the distribution system the defendant had built with other downstream firms. 
The	way	it	was	built	was	not	considered	to	be	efficient.	In	the	case	of	Group	
Multipurpose	S.R.L.	and	Dispra	E.I.R.L.	vs.	Quimpac	S.A.	and	Clorox	Peru	
SA	 (No.	 003-2003/CLC),	 INDECOPI´s	 Competition	 Commission	 ordered	
Quimpac	S.A.	that,	“as long as it maintains a dominant position in the pro-
duction and distribution of sodium hypochlorite, it cannot establish exclusive 
relationships that may create vertical restraints on competition”. The alleged 
efficiencies	of	the	Quimpac-Clorox	exclusive	agreement	were	noregarded	as	
“sufficient”	to	prove	licit.	In	addition,	the	authority	decided	to	fine	the	defend-
ants	 with	 325.93	TIU’s.	 In	Tele	 Cable	 Inc.	 vs.	 Telefónica	 del	 Peru	 S.A.A.,	
Telefónica	Multimedia	S.A.C.,	Fox	Latin	American	Channel	Inc.	and	Turner	
Broadcasting	System	Latin	America	Inc.,	OSIPTEL	ordered	the	cessation	of	
exclusive	 distribution	 between	 Fox	 and	Turner	—as	 signal	 providers—	 and	
Telefónica —a cable television operator— for the aforementioned exclusivity 
illegally excluded a cable operator competitor (Tele Cable) and hence damaged 
the efficiency of the competitive process.
At this point we intend to emphasize that these decisions, from their own 
theoretical	 frameworks	 and	 purposes,	 are oriented to redefine contractual 
terms and conditions on which the resources are to be allocated in productive 
activities, thus modify the structure of existing economic relationships, aiming 
at the improvement of efficiency and coordination of the competitive system. 
The recurring requirement that Competition agencies perform a thoughtful 
analysis on social costs and benefits generated by the behavior under inves-
tigation —i.e. the “Rule of Reason” — is based on the correcting role of the 
agency.
3	 TIU	stands	for	Tributary	Impositive	Unit.
35
It	is	in	this	sense	that	we	can	assume	the	activity	of	the	competition	agency	
to the entrepreneurial one. Remember that entrepreneurs face uncertainty on 
what to produce (what will consumers want more urgently related to other 
goods?) and what contractual arrangements establish for this purpose (what is 
the proper industrial organization for the production of an specific good?); they 
generate	pure	profit	opportunities	when	lack	of	coordination	or	inefficiencies	
is	perceived	 in	 the	current	market	conditions.	Thus,	 they	use	 their	 judgment	
—i.e. expectations and their particular reading of the context— and proceed to 
reallocate resources through newer contractual arrangements with owners of 
factors of production in order to produce more valuable goods, in better condi-
tions than those offered to date. While it can be argued that the motivations of 
the Competition agency and private entrepreneurs are not the same4, we must 
admit that, when comparing both activities, the contents of their actions are 
essentially the same: the reallocation of resources and the modification of the 
existing contractual arrangements to achieve greater efficiency or coordinative 
situations.	So,	finally,	the	market	ends	up	being	a	dynamic	process	driven	by	
entrepreneurial actions, whether the latter are exercised by private entrepre-
neurs or governmental agencies.
Alike	 private	 entrepreneurs,	 when	 evaluating	 the	 anti-competitiveness	
about	the	behaviors	of	the	undertakings,	it	is	inevitable	that	the	Competition	
agency	performs	two	essential	tasks:	(i)	an	interpretation	over	the	institutions	
and	signals	of	the	current	productive	structure	(that	is,	it	seeks	to	explain	why	
things	work	the	way	they	work	in	a	certain	market)	and	(ii)	Speculation	about	
future	market	conditions	with	and	without	the	impacts	of	their	own	involve-
ment.	The	 underlying	 cognitive	 demands	 of	 these	 tasks	 cannot	 be	 based	 on	
scientific,	 technical	 or	 objective	 knowledge,	 as	 these	 simply	 help	 to	 under-
stand the general dynamics of phenomena and provide reasonable order among 
thoughts.	In	contrast,	the	analysis	of	Antitrust	cases	requires	a	set	of	relevance	
judgments, value judgments, the creation of subjective expectations on many 
aspects	of	the	current	economy,	and	other	non-articulated	knowledge	that	are	
put together to face uncertainty in the specific case. This helps to understand 
the real nature of any apparently “corrective” economic decision: they are but 
bets. This does not mean the Competition agency performs poor analyses; but 
that	 efficiency-corrective	 decisions	 are	 an	 erroneous	 target	 for	 the	 antitrust	
system.
This finding allows us to move forward with some results. Political mo-
4	 It	is	clear	that	the	Competition	agency	seeks	for	efficiency	as	long	as	it	is	regarded	a	standard	of	social	
welfare,	while	private	entrepreneurs	improve	economic	coordination	for	this	strategy	yields	profits.
36
tivations (such as the deliberate promotion of innovation, wealth transfer, 
protection of small businesses, etc.) some Antitrust theorists strive to exclude 
from	this	discipline	(Cáceres,	2006)	are	expressions	of	value	judgments	in	the	
same	sense	efficiency-based	Antitrust	decisions	are	expressions	of	value	judg-
ments. The alleged neutrality of an analysis based only on efficiency is contra-
dictory,	since	efficiency	itself	already	contains	the	requirement	to	make	a	value	
judgment and subjective estimations of the costs and benefits of the behavior 
under	investigation	(De	Leon,	2006).	So,	it	is	not	merely	an	optimization	kind	
of decision. When the Competition authority bans, sanctions or promotes a dif-
ferent resource allocation from what individuals have spontaneously arrived, 
it is betting in favor of a different arrangement structure under the expectation 
the latter will be more efficient and productive. 
Some	economic	literature	(Coloma,	2007)	argue	that	the	problem	of	arbi-
trariness or subjectivity of Antitrust decisions can be solved using a thoughtful 
cost	benefit	analysis	(“CBA”)	about	the	social	impacts	of	the	behavior	under	
investigation.	However,	to	extrapolate	an	individual	(or	firm-level)	CBA	into	
a	 social	 level	—i.e.	market	 as	an	entity—	as	a	guarantee	 for	 technicality	or	
impartiality	raises	very	difficult	problems.	Firstly,	there	are	no	specific	“tech-
nical” purposes, neither “objective” costs or benefits. The purposes, costs and 
benefits are all arbitrary elements, whether the assessment is done by the pri-
vate entrepreneur or the Competition agency, since they stem from a preference 
or an expectation	as	a	last	resort,	i.e.	non-articulated	knowledge.	Secondly,	at	
the social level, it is extremely difficult to determine how many individuals 
benefit	and/or	are	harmed	as	a	result	of	the	alleged	anticompetitive	behavior.	It	
is	even	more	difficult	to	know	the	magnitude	of	the	individual	benefit	or	harm.	
For	example,	after	the	conclusion	of	a	vertical	integration	between	a	producer	
and an exclusive distributor in order to align their trade policies and operate a 
common brand, while excluding other distributors and increasing prices, some 
consumers may believe that the confidence in a brand operated by vertically in-
tegrated firms justify paying higher prices, while others may believe that price 
is the most important variable and, thus, they feel damaged by this contractual 
arrangement. Even with accurate data on the positive and negative effects of 
the	denounced	conduct,	the	task	of	discriminating	between	net-benefited	and	
net-damaged	consumers	remains.	Furthermore,	it	is	not	clear	how	the	author-
ity is able to add, subtract and compensate these individual effects on a social 
level while remaining “neutral” at the same time. Consequently, to extrapolate 
the	individual	CBA	method	into	aggregate	decision-making	as	a	criterion	for	
objectivity or neutrality is just an attempt to give external scientific appearance 
to	discretional	decisions.	Inevitably,	this	kind	of	aggregate	CBA	analysis	gives	
37
prominence to certain effects or results, helping some individuals above the in-
terests of others, thereby revealing that the pursuit of a neutral efficiency is not 
different from those other purposes fiercely repudiated in the Antitrust Law.
Some	might	argue	 that	Competition	agencies	do	not	seek	 to	 impose	 the	
interests	 of	 some	 over	 the	 others,	 but	 basically,	 that	 they	 use	 a	 non-market	
mechanism —i.e., intervention into the productive structure— to replicate a 
result	close	to	the	efficiencies	that	the	market	would	providein	the	absence	of	
market	power	distortions.	It	is	said	that	antitrust	decisions	would	only	be	imi-
tating	the	results	the	market	itself	would	have	achieved	(Gómez	and	Zúñiga,	
2005).	Nevertheless,	is	it	really	possible	to	know	those	efficiencies	without	the	
discovery	process	itself?	In	a	competitive	scenario,	the	combinations	of	factors	
of production, the level of investment and productive capacity, the firm size or 
the length, scope and terms of commercial arrangements respond to decisions 
made on the basis of entrepreneurial judgment within a specific context: the 
“know-how”	(Hardin,	2009).	These	decisions	are	constantly	changing	due	to	
a learning process driven by the discovery of new competitive —i.e. rival— 
reallocations	of	resources.	In	this	perspective,	to	replicate	the	efficiencies	of	
the	market	is	meaningless,	as	it	requires	knowing	those	economically	feasible	
and	sustainable	efficiencies	of	a	market	without	the	market	discovery	process	
itself. Clearly it is an impossible claim. Therefore the problem is not exactly 
what the Competition agencies do, but the goal set for them by the doctrine 
and the law.
Additionally,	it	is	widely	accepted	that,	in	the	context	of	a	market	economy,	
entrepreneurs can experiment with different types of strategies to create ben-
efits.	Sullivan	and	Grimes	(2006)	recognize	the	advantages	of	this	“entrepre-
neurial strategies pluralism” by saying: “decentralized decision making allows 
different players to experiment with different strategies. many companies will 
make wrong decisions and fail terribly. there is a social cost in these failures. 
However, the positive side is that every entrepreneur must constantly adjust 
to changing market conditions to remain competitive, reinforcing confidence 
within the market, where competition ensures that companies fix the condi-
tions and focused on the future. in this context, the entrepreneur who does not 
comply will risk to failure. moreover, it is because decisions are decentralized 
that the market reduces the risk of a costly mistake, which would be greater in 
centralized planning”	(Sullivan	and	Grimes,	2006).	Taking	the	advantages	of	
entrepreneurial	pluralism	into	account,	one	of	the	most	important	risks	caused	
by the claim of technicality, objectivity and impartiality of the Competition 
agency is that it may hold certain entrepreneurial strategies are anticompetitive 
38
only because their economic rationale was not fully understood, or because 
it	holds	different	 interpretations	of	 the	market	conditions	(V.g.	 the	possibili-
ties of certain industrial organization), estimations and expectations for future 
market	conditions,	than	those	interpretations,	estimations	and	expectations	the	
undertakings	hold.	In	other	words,	given	the	Competition	agency	has	a	de facto 
monopoly on defining what strategies are efficient and what are not, sanc-
tions	and	bans	may	be	imposed	whenever	the	undertakings	can´t	persuade	the	
agency —with articulated and formalized arguments— about the efficiency of 
their decisions and strategies.
A	couple	 of	 cases	 can	 illustrate	 these	 points:	 In	Development	Fund	 for	
South	Dairy	Farming	(FONGALSUR)	against	GLORIA	S.A.,	milk	producers	
association	FONGALSUR	denounced	GLORIA	S.A.	for	committing	discrimi-
natory	practices	in	the	wholesale	milk	purchasing	market.	Alleged	discrimina-
tion would consist of the provision of better benefits to farmers belonging to 
a	 rival	 association	FONGAL-AREQUIPA.	Although	 the	 complaint	was	 dis-
missed	 by	 the	 Competition	 Commission	 by	 Resolution	 003-93-INDECOPI/
CLC, it was stated: “that, with respect to the granting of different prices for 
suppliers and farmers, it has been shown that in order to encourage the crea-
tion and consolidation of Fongal aReQuipa, gloRia S.a. engaged into 
this practice until February, 1992. nevertheless, upon the failure to prove the 
persistence of this conduct, the commission cannot give it a different value 
than mere history (...)”.
Under	 the	same	reasoning,	what	would	have	happened	if	GLORIA	S.A.	
had	 persisted	 in	 the	 allegedly	 discriminatory	 conduct?	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	
procedure,	FONGALSUR	argued	that	GLORIA	had	“broken	the	unity	of	their	
Union”	when	it	promoted	the	formation	of	the	Union’s	rival	FONGAL-AREQ-
UIPA	and	offered	certain	benefits	only	to	farmers	affiliated	to	the	latter.	How	
would	INDECOPI	determine	—scientifically—	whether	 this	kind	of	promo-
tion	was	 an	 efficiency	 of	 a	market	 without	market	 power	 distortions	 or	 an	
inefficient	behavior	 to	be	 corrected?	 It	was	quite	 conceivable	 that	GLORIA	
S.A.	wanted	to	strengthen	its	trade	relationships	only	with	a	particular	farmers	
sector in order to assess an eventual integration, as well as it was conceiv-
able	that,	in	effect,	GLORIA	actually	wanted	to	“break	the	Union’s	unity”	to	
limit their bargaining power. Are we facing objectively inefficient strategies, 
or conversely, competitive strategies? Without the process of trial and error, 
it is merely arbitrary to officially declare that a strategy oriented to limit the 
bargaining power of the counterparty, or any other intended to grant favorable 
terms	 to	 a	 certain	 sector	 of	 farmers,	 is	 anticompetitive.	Strictly	 speaking,	 it	
39
is speculative to declare certain strategy does not correspond to an efficiency 
that	would	have	resulted	in	an	undistorted	market.	If	INDECOPI	had	declared	
proven the legal claim on discrimination, it would have favored deliberately 
the	 existing	 level	 of	 bargaining	 power	 in	 favor	 the	 FONGALSUR	 farmers,	
above the interests and benefits of other certain farmers affiliated to the newer 
Union	 commercially	 closer	 to	GLORIA	 (FONGAL-AREQUIPA).	 Similarly,	
if	INDECOPI	had	ordered	the	cessation	of	beneficial	conditions	to	the	latter	
farmers, it would have changed the prevailing structure of economic relation-
ships	for	another	one	regarded	as	more	efficient.	In	any	case,	the	decision	that	
would be a real entrepreneurial action: judgmental, fallible and subject to the 
mechanism of profit and loss.
In	the	case	of	the	Peruvian	Association	of	Port	Operators	and	others	vs.	
Pilot	Station	S.A.	(PILOT)	and	others,	by	Resolution	037-2005-INDECOPI/
CLC	the	Competition	Commission	upheld	a	complaint	against	PILOT,	for	its	
exclusive arrangements policies concentrated almost all of the existing licensed 
sea pilots. Moreover, this scheme was reinforced because contracts with pilots 
fixed a penalty for resignation which, in practice, formed an exit barrier for 
them. This led to the exclusion of other sea pilot firms which had no available 
staff	 to	 carry	 out	 their	 activities.	This	 situation	 allowed	PILOT	 to	maintain	
high prices during the investigation period. These increases did not respond 
to any productive or innovative efficiency, but to the misconduct displayed by 
PILOT.	The	decision	was	confirmed	in	the	Appeals	Tribunal,	which	forced	the	
undertaking	to	abstain	from	enforcing	such	contractual	arrangements	for	they	
were considered as anticompetitive. 
In	 this	 decision,	 as	 we	 shall	 see	 below,	 INDECOPI	 hinted	 some	 bias	
against	entrepreneurship.	As	it	is	well	known,	labor	unions	are	organizations	
designed to protect the interests of its members and may bargain collectively 
against	their	employers	without	breaking	any	laws	of	free	competition.	They	
are	“legal	cartels”.	It	is	understood	that	this	type	of	unionization	is	beneficial	
in some way because it mitigates the bargaining power usually attributed to 
employers.	But,	what	happens	when	workers	decide	to	unionize	and	also	start	
a	service	firm?	In	the	case	under	review,	before	the	creation	of	PILOT,	there	
were several sea pilot firms in the Callao Port Terminal (TPC) that appeared 
to show very high profit margins. Employed sea pilots decided to start their 
own	pilotage	firm	—PILOT—	in	order